11 57. The negotiations lasted for four months and four days, during which time several 24 meetings took place between the government and MRTA members. In early March, the former president of the Republic visited the Dominican Republic and Cuba to investigate places that might 25 receive the MRTA members. 58. On March 6, 1997, Néstor Cerpa, the leader of the MRTA group, announced the suspension of the talks after discovering that the government had dug a tunnel in order to storm the residence. On March 12, 1997, one more meeting was held between the government interlocutor and MRTA representatives and this reopened the talks. On March 13, 1997, the Commission of Guarantors held its first separate meeting with the MRTA in an effort to soften its position, and subsequently held its 26 first separate meeting with the government interlocutor. 59. On March 21, 1997, the Commission of Guarantors issued an appeal to the government and the MRTA, warning that the situation was “reaching a possible endpoint.” Néstor Cerpa refused to accept the idea of asylum in Cuba; he insisted on the release of his comrades and announced the suspension of dialogue, accusing the government of planning an incursion into the residence through a 27 tunnel. 60. On April 22, 1997, “in light of the failure of the talks to reach a peaceful solution to the hostage problem in the residence of the Ambassador of Japan, and left with no option other than the use of force,” the President of the Republic ordered the hostage rescue operation.” 28 Implementation of Operation Nipón 96 or Chavín de Huántar 61. Parallel to the negotiations, then President Fujimori had ordered the Commander General of the Army, Major General E.P. Nicolás de Bari Hermoza Ríos, National Intelligence Service advisor Vladimiro Montesinos Torres, and the military high command to prepare a contingency plan to rescue the 29 hostages in case the negotiations failed. General Augusto Jaime Patiño ordered Colonel José Williams 30 Zapata to prepare Operations Plan Nipón 96. 62. According to Operation Plan Nipón 96, its objective was to seize control of the property in order to “capture or eliminate the MRTA terrorists and rescue the hostages in order to establish the rule of law and contribute to the consolidation of national pacification.” To this end, they should use “measures and actions designed to prevent or neutralize terrorist actions …and (should) not commit excesses of any sort, maintaining absolute respect for HR, which is not to say that forceful action would not be taken. ”31 24 Appendix 1, TRC, 2.66. EXTRAJUDICIAL EXECUTIONS IN THE RESIDENCE OF THE AMBASSADOR OF JAPAN (1997), TRC, http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/pdf/TOMO%20VII/Casos%20Ilustrativos-UIE/2.66.%20%20ENABJADA%20JAPON.pdf. 25 Appendix 1, TRC, 2.66. EXTRAJUDICIAL EXECUTIONS IN THE RESIDENCE OF THE AMBASSADOR OF JAPAN (1997), TRC, http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/pdf/TOMO%20VII/Casos%20Ilustrativos-UIE/2.66.%20%20ENABJADA%20JAPON.pdf. 26 Appendix 1, TRC, 2.66. EXTRAJUDICIAL EXECUTIONS IN THE RESIDENCE OF THE AMBASSADOR OF JAPAN (1997), TRC, http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/pdf/TOMO%20VII/Casos%20Ilustrativos-UIE/2.66.%20%20ENABJADA%20JAPON.pdf. 27 Appendix 1, TRC, 2.66. EXTRAJUDICIAL EXECUTIONS IN THE RESIDENCE OF THE AMBASSADOR OF JAPAN (1997), TRC, http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/pdf/TOMO%20VII/Casos%20Ilustrativos-UIE/2.66.%20%20ENABJADA%20JAPON.pdf. 28 Appendix 2, Operation Plan A “NIPON” 96 (1 st Special Forces [FFEE] Division), Appendix 5 to the State’s communication of February 6, 2009, submitted at the public hearing. 29 Appendix 1, TRC, 2.66. EXTRAJUDICIAL EXECUTIONS IN THE RESIDENCE OF THE AMBASSADOR OF JAPAN (1997), TRC, http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/pdf/TOMO%20VII/Casos%20Ilustrativos-UIE/2.66.%20%20ENABJADA%20JAPON.pdf. See also, Appendix 3, Non-certified copy of the order to initiate proceedings of June 11, 2002, appendix to the State’s communication of August 5, 2008 and February 6, 2009 and appendix to the representatives’ communication of April 22, 2008. Appendix to the State’s communication of December 1, 2003, submitted at the public hearing. 30 Appendix 1, TRC, 2.66. EXTRAJUDICIAL EXECUTIONS IN THE RESIDENCE OF THE AMBASSADOR OF JAPAN (1997), TRC, http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/pdf/TOMO%20VII/Casos%20Ilustrativos-UIE/2.66.%20%20ENABJADA%20JAPON.pdf. 31 Appendix 2, Operations plan A “NIPON” 96 (1 st division Special Forces [FFEE]), Appendix 5 to the State’s communication of February 6, 2009. Submitted at the public hearing.