6 B. Position of the State 32. During the public hearing held at the IACHR, the State asserted that the instant case “is among those that has most deeply moved Peruvian society” and added that though the Commission, in its admissibility report, had found indications that illicit acts were committed, that does not negate the fact that the operation was a success and 71 hostages were freed unharmed. With respect to the investigations initiated, Peru reported that the military proceeding is closed and that the Peruvian constitutional system provides no recourse for the review of judgments handed down by the Supreme Council of Military Justice. The State added that the case of Eduardo Cruz Sánchez, alias Tito, was not included in the military proceeding. With regard to the jurisdiction of the military justice system, the State reported that both the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court handed down rulings in 2004 in which they established that human rights abuses were not duty-related crimes. It added that the Constitutional Court held that the composition of the military justice system should be changed given its dependence on the Executive Branch and had called for the passage of the necessary legislation to proceed with this adjustment. Finally, the State indicated that the current panorama “is complex in terms of which entities should pronounce” in the instant case and concluded therefore, that “it expects its authorities to proceed in accordance with the law” in relation to the illegal acts. 33. In its communications, the State asserted that the instant case is a matter of “national security and therefore must be handled and analyzed with the appropriate confidentiality, ensuring due process guarantees (…) as subjects of international law, and should not be regarded exclusively from one vehement and impassioned point of view, but rather from the standpoint of a State carrying out sovereign and necessary actions in fulfillment of the role that corresponds to all States to the benefit of their citizens.” 34. The State alleged that the Chavín de Huántar operation, whose objective was to rescue the hostages, was completely planned, responsible, and “prioritized the life of the hostages and the terrorists.” It was not an improvised operation that disregarded the planning and tactics to be followed. The State reported that the operation put an end “to an act of urban terrorism” and that the hostage rescue “brought tranquility to Peruvian and Japanese society, which had been left in suspense day after day as their fellow citizens were deprived of their liberty and faced routine threats against their lives.” The State therefore had the obligation to “guarantee the right to life of the hostages and find a solution to the terrorist action.” 35. The State claimed that the members of the MRTA “knew from the start that an act of that nature carried with it the risks inherent to an illicit act” It added that the members of the MRTA were heavily armed and used their weapons during the battle, which resulted in the death of one hostage and two commandos. 36. In relation to the jurisdiction of the military justice system, the State pointed out that based on the complaint lodged by the petitioners for events related to the seizure of the Embassy of Peru, the Prosecutor of the Court Martial [Consejo de Guerra Militar Especial] had charged Néstor Cerpa Cartolini and other military personnel for the crime of treason against the fatherland. It went on to say that subsequently, the Court Martial appointed an Ad Hoc Special Military Criminal Judge to preside over the case. On June 26, 2002, the Supreme Council of Military Justice ruled that the Third Specialized Criminal Court of the Superior Court of Lima should desist from the investigative phase, since the Armed Forces personnel were included in the initiation of the investigative phase before the Court Martial of the Supreme Council of Military Justice. In response, the Third Specialized Criminal Court filed a jurisdictional challenge. The Transitory Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court then proceeded to settle the challenge in favor of the military jurisdiction. 37. In its ruling on the jurisdictional challenge, the Supreme Court held that the operation was conducted pursuant to a superior order in the discharge of a duty and therefore the perpetrators should be subject to the jurisdiction of the military justice system under the domestic law in force at that time. In synthesis, according to the State, the acts were tried in the military jurisdiction for the following reasons: (i) the accused were active duty officers; (ii) they were acting in the discharge of their assigned duties in a