and that it also violated the obligation of states parties to the Convention to impose penalties, given that those responsible were not appropriately punished. They say that as a consequence of the foregoing, the State has violated its obligation to ensure free and full exercise of the rights recognized by the American Convention. 14. Article 103 of the Criminal Code provides: “If the guilty party comes forward or is found before the statutory limitation for the criminal proceeding or the penalty has expired, but half of that time period has already elapsed, in either case, in considering such limitations, the tribunal shall recognize that fact as amounting to two or more mitigating circumstances and not as an aggravating factor, and shall apply the rules contained in Articles 65, 66, 67, and 68, either in imposing the sentence, or to reduce the one already imposed. This rule does not apply to statutory limitations on misdemeanors and special short-term limitations. The petitioners say that the judgments declare that the criminal-law concept recognized in Article 103 of the Criminal Code is a circumstance mitigating criminal liability that influences the determination of the length of the sentence, and therefore the prohibition on applying statutory limitations, recognized by international law, does not affect it because it is a separate concept, with differing premises and consequences. They say that this assertion by the Court is patently contradictory, as it cannot recognize in its ruling the prohibition on applying statutory limitations to crimes of this nature, and at the same time apply a benefit that precisely considers the time elapsed since the crime was committed, having particular regard to the fact that the statutory time period is close to lapsing. 15. The petitioners say that the Supreme Court has held that the application of this rule “is grounded on the assumption that the offense has been forgotten, on procedural considerations and on the need not to punish the conduct, which leads to the crime going unpunished” and “is based on the idea that it is meaningless to impose such a harsh sentence for events that occurred a long time ago but that must be punished, with the result being a lighter sentence.” 16. The petitioners also argue that the Supreme Court lacks authority to adopt decisions as a trial court. They say that the Supreme Court is a court of cassation that rules on matters of law, whose authority only extends to the examination of errors of law, and that, by exceeding and misusing that power, it has become a court of third instance examining matters of fact and law, with the result that, in reclassifying facts that have already proved and classified by the appropriate bodies, it is overreaching its powers as an impartial tribunal and, in so doing, violating the principle of legality. They also argue that when the Court “annuls sua sponte” and applies a mitigating factor such as the partial statute of limitations, it prevents the victims from having free access to present their arguments to that tribunal, thereby depriving them of the possibility of a hearing and appeal against the decision. 17. They hold that the State, by being a party to or tolerating the actions of the Supreme Court, has violated its general obligation to ensure the free and full exercise of rights, is fostering chronic repetition of human rights violations, and is leaving the families of the aggrieved utterly defenseless. 18. They argue that the obligation to impose penalties was violated because the benefits applied signified that the guilty parties were allowed to remain largely unpunished, and that by applying partially mitigating circumstances and giving weight to the passage of time, the State infringed its obligations to respect and ensure the free and full exercise of rights recognized in the Convention. The petitioners say that one of the purposes of the penalty in punishing conduct that constitutes a crime against humanity is that for the victims and their families reparation entails a punishment commensurate with the seriousness of the crime, with the understanding that said reparation is also an obligation for the State. They say that if the State grants the guilty parties the benefit of partially mitigating circumstances that reduces their liability, as it does by applying partial statutory limitations, the punishment is far from being disciplinary in practice and, therefore, the reparation falls short of being comprehensive. They add that the applicable punishment for a crime against humanity must be in proportion to the crime committed, a generally recognized principle enshrined in various instruments. 19. They say that the rule that the applicable penalty for a crime against humanity must be proportional to the crime committed is a general principle recognized in different international bodies of law, including the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Article 4.2), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (Article 3), the Convention on the Prevention and 4