42. Therefore, the Commission observes that the alleged victim’s failure to file the lawsuit seeking compensation for judicial errors based on a law that was in force at the time of the facts means that the Commission cannot find that the admissibility requirement set forth in Article 46(1)(a) of the Convention has been met with regard to this aspect of the petition, as domestic remedies were not properly exhausted. 2. Deadline for submitting the petition 43. Article 46(1)(b) of the Convention provides that, for the petition to be declared admissible, it must have been lodged within a period of six months from the date on which the party alleging the rights violation was notified of the final judgment that exhausted remedies under domestic law. 44. The Commission recalls that in this case, with regard to the allegations surrounding the disciplinary proceeding that culminated in the petitioner’s dismissal, the domestic remedies were exhausted with the constitutional judgment issued on October 25, 1999. 45. Consequently, given that the petition was submitted on December 24, 1998, the domestic remedies were exhausted while the case was undergoing the admissibility phase. According to the Commission’s case law, analysis of the requirements as set forth in Article 46(1)(b) of the Convention must be conducted based on the situation as of the moment the admissibility or inadmissibility of the claim is established.3 The Commission therefore concludes that the petition meets the requirement set forth in Article 46(1)(b) of the American Convention. 3. Colorable Claim 46. For the purposes of admissibility, the Commission must decide if the petition describes facts that could characterize a violation, as stipulated in Article 47(b) of the American Convention, or if it is “manifestly groundless” or “obviously out of order,” pursuant to subparagraph (c) of that article. The standard for assessing these circumstances is different from the standard required to rule on the merits of a petition. The Commission must conduct a prima facie evaluation to assess whether the petition provides the basis for an apparent or potential violation of the rights guaranteed by the Convention, not for establishing the existence of a violation. Such an evaluation is a summary review that does not prejudice or advance an opinion on the merits. 47. As regards colorable claim, the alleged victim argued that the State violated his rights as set forth in article 8 and 25 of the American Convention when it dismissed him from his position as a magistrate of the Superior Court of Justice of Huánuco and refused to reinstate him to the judiciary. For its part, the State argued that the petitioner was provided with due process guarantees in the disciplinary process resulting in his dismissal, as well as in the framework of the constitutional amparo he had filed previously. 48. The IACHR concludes that, should it be proven that Mr. Humberto Cajahuanca Vásquez was dismissed as a result of the alleged application of a disciplinary sanction that was ambiguous and more severe than what was established as of the date of the facts alleged, the alleged impossibility of appealing his dismissal, and the alleged lack of an effective judicial response by the bodies hearing the amparo claim could violate the rights enshrined in articles 9, 8, 23(1), and 25 of the American Convention, in conjunction with the violation of the general obligations set forth in articles 1(1) and 2 of the Convention. IV. PROVEN FACTS A. Regarding the legal framework applicable to disciplinary proceedings carried out against judges in Peru IACHR Report No. 15/15, Petition 374-05. Members of the Trade Union of Workers of the National Federation of Coffee Growers of Colombia. Colombia. March 24, 2015, para. 41. Also see Inter-American Court, Case of Wong Ho Wing v. Peru. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment June 30, 2015. Series C No. 297, para. 25-28. 3 7