10 about impartiality10. The State should have provided the 257 victims with a mechanism or recourse that would allow them, if necessary, to question the impartiality of the members of the deciding body11. However, there is no evidence proving that the victims or their representatives had exhausted any recourse or request to that end. The Tribunal finds that no elements of conviction have been furnished in order to prove the lack of impartiality of the members of the CEE. 29. As has been mentioned, on April 16, 2009, the CEE issued a resolution by which it decided to declare, in a final and binding manner, that the 257 victims named in the Judgment of the Court were dismissed in an irregular and unjustified manner from the Congress of the Republic of Peru. Afterwards, the State informed that, through its courts, it had validated said decision of the CEE. Even though said resolution has been ratified at the domestic level, the Tribunal notes that the determination of the respective legal consequences and, if applicable, the compensations applicable to each one of the victims are still pending. B. Body with the power to establish the respective legal consequences and, if applicable, determine the applicable compensations based on the specific circumstances of each individual. 30. That the State alleged that, as experts in labor law, the members of the CEE reviewed the personal files of all the victims and analyzed factors like the age of the people, the years of service and the income earned to devise the formula that would apply to the determination of the exact compensation owed to each person. It also noted that the compensation is not the same for all the victims, since it is calculated based on the years of service of each individual. Finally, it emphasized that the victims had the opportunity to file their arguments before the CEE by means of the time limit granted to the common interveners to submit their observations, but that the common interveners did not take that opportunity. 31. That the common interveners pointed out that, during the process of the CEE, the only opportunity given to the victims to file the arguments or information or observations was a period of time of fifteen minutes granted to the common interveners, which was not notified with sufficient notice and that it was planned for a few days before the issuance of the final resolution of said body. They also highlighted that the compensation of two basic minimum wages for each year of service is unique and that, given that it only varies depending on the years of service of each victim, it does not relate to the specific circumstances of each one of the victims. 32. That a group of victims, by means of its representatives, argued that the Court in its Judgment requested the State to guarantee the victims "with a true access to justice according to the standards established in the American Convention", which implies due process of law and which "would be necessary so that a person demanding justice can enforce its rights and defend its interests in an effective manner, respecting equality between the parties". In a similar way, another group of victims sustained that the work method of the CEE does not offer the guarantees of due process. 10 Cf. Case of Apitz Barbera et al. (“First Court of Administrative Disputes”) V. Venezuela, supra note 10, para. 56. See also, European Court of Human Rights, Pullar v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 10 June 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-III, § 30, y Fey v. Austria, judgment of 24 February 1993, Series A no. 255-A p. 8, § 28. 11 Cf. Case of Apitz Barbera et al. (“First Court of Administrative Disputes”) V. Venezuela, supra note 10, para. 63 to 66.