18 the rights of [a company]”.53 Likewise, in the case of Kuliś and Różycki v. Poland54 the European Court pointed out that the protection of the right to reputation of a company was a “lawful purpose” according to Article 10(2) of the European Convention. 66. Therefore, the Tribunal considers that the purpose in this case is legitimate since it tries to protect a right that the Venezuelan domestic legislation recognizes to the Armed Forces and, in general, such right is set forth in the American Convention regarding natural persons. However, it is relevant to clarify that the legitimacy of the purpose is only one of the elements in this analysis of proportionality and it does not necessarily mean that such restriction has been legal (this has already been analyzed by the Tribunal supra paras. 50 to 58), using the most suitable, necessary, or proportional means (which the Tribunal shall analyze infra paras. 67 to 68). 67. As regards the suitability of the criminal action to achieve the sought-after purpose, the Court has warned previously, and reiterates in this case, that although a criminal instrument may be suitable to restrict the abusive exercise of certain rights, provided this serves the purpose of safeguarding the juridical good to be protected,55 the above does not mean that the use of the criminal forum to impose further liabilities for exercising the freedom of expression shall be necessary or proportional in all cases (infra paras. 69 to 88). 68. In this case, the Court has already declared that the military criminal legislation that determined further liabilities for Mr. Usón Ramírez exercising his freedom of expression is not compatible with the Convention since it is excessively vague and ambiguous (supra para. ***). Consequently, the Court considers that in this case the criminal way was not suitable. a.3) Need for the measure used 69. The Commission pointed out that “the criminal sanctions and their seriousness should never be used as a resource to suffocate any public debate on questions of general interest, nor to limit criticism of officials in the exercise their functions, the State, or its institutions.” Furthermore, the Commission indicated that “[i]n a democratic society the punitive power is only exercised insofar as it is strictly necessary to protect the fundamental juridical goods from serious attacks damaging or jeopardizing them[;] otherwise it would lead to an abusive exercise of the punitive power of the State.” 70. In this regard, the representatives alleged that “the criminal sanction applied to [Mr.] Usón was not necessary to protect a reputation that had not been attacked.” For the representatives “nothing that Usón [Ramírez] said could be construed as insultous or offensive; there was no purpose to denigrate the military institution, where he was trained and which he served for over two decades.” “There was a judgmental assessment on a hypothetical[,to which] Mr. Usón used the conditional tense, clearly showing that his comment was merely technical, and that he could not confirm [the truth or falseness] of that hypothetical.” 71. According to the State, “this was the opinion issued by a member of the National Armed Forces who, to make matters more severe, had held important positions at military level and beyond, which thus illustrates more discredit and comtempt of the National Armed 53 Steel and Morris v. the United Kingdom, supra note 52, § 95. 54 Cf. Kuliś and Różycki v. Poland, no.27209/03, § 34, § 35, ECHR 2009. 55 Cf. Case of Kimel, supra note 41, para. 76, and Case of Tristán Donoso, supra note 38, para. 118.