21 80. In this case, the restriction would have to achieve an important satisfaction of the right to honor or reputation which the domestic right recognizes belongs to the Armed Forces without making the right to free criticism non-existent against their performance as representative instances of the State. The following shall be analyzed: i) the degree of impact to one of the goods at stake, determining whether the intensity of such impact was serious, intermediate, or moderate; ii) the importance of the satisfaction of the opposite good, and iii) whether its satisfaction justifies the restriction of the other one. In some cases, the balance shall tip in favor of the freedom of expression and in other cases to safeguard the right to honor and reputation.63 81. As regards the affectation of the freedom of expression, the Court considers that the consequences of being subjected to trial in a military court (infra paras. 107 to 116); the criminal trial itself; the preventive deprivation of freedom imposed on him; the sanction depriving him of liberty for five years and six months to which he was judgmentd; including him in the criminal record; the loss of revenues during the time he was in prison; the affectation of the exercise of the rights that are restricted due to the sanction imposed; being far away from his family and loved ones; the latent risk of losing his personal liberty, and the stigmatizing effect of the criminal sanction imposed on Mr. Usón Ramírez show that the further liabilities established in this case were truly very serious.64 82. As regards the importance of the right to honor or reputation that the domestic law recognizes to the Armed Forces, the Tribunal indicated in this Judgment that determining whether the Armed Forces have a right to honor or reputation (supra para. 45) is not within its scope. However, in an analogous manner, the Tribunal has pointed out before that it is extremely important to satisfy the honor or reputation of whoever has been offended, particularly in the case of a serious crime regarding an individual. Nevertheless, the satisfaction of such good does not necessarily justify the restriction of the right to freedom of expression in any case. 83. To that end, it shall be reiterated that in the test of proportionality it should be taken into account that the expressions about the exercise of the functions of the State Institutions have a greater protection, in the sense that they can promote a democratic debate in society.65 That is the case because it is supposed that in a democratic society the state institutions or entities66 as such are exposed to public scrutiny and criticism, and their activities are inserted in the domain of public debate67. This threshold is not based on the quality of the subject but on the public interest of the activities carried out68. Hence larger tolerance should face the affirmations and considerations made by citizens when exercising their democratic right.69 Such are the demands for pluralism of a truly democratic society,70 63 Cf. Case of Kimel, supra note 41, para. 84. 64 Cf. Case of Kimel, supra note 41, para. 85. 65 Cf. Case of Herrera Ulloa, supra note 40, para. 128; Case of Kimel, supra note 41, para. 86, and Case of Ricardo Canese, supra note 38, para. 98. 66 Cf. ECHR, Case Castells, supra note 59, § 42 and 46. 67 Cf. Case of Herrera Ulloa, supra note 40, para. 129; Case of Kimel, supra note 41, para. 86, and Case of Ricardo Canese, supra note 38, para. 103.. 68 Cf. Case of Herrera Ulloa, supra note 40, para. 129; Case of Kimel, supra note 41, para. 86, and Case of Palamara Iribarne, supra note 47, para. 84. 69 Cf. Case of Claude Reyes et al., supra note 44, para. 87; Case of Kimel, supra note 41, para. 86, and Case of Palamara Iribarne, supra note 47, para. 83.