28 Armed Forces, then they have an interest and are not independent, is the same as [saying] that if he offends the Judicial Branch, then there exists no judge which could try the case because such judge is part of the Judicial Branch.” 107. When analyzing this matter, the Court shall deal with the issue of the competence of the military court, and then the allegations regarding the impartiality of the military tribunals in Venezuela. However, it is relevant to make some general considerations about the competence of the military criminal jurisdiction. 108. The Court has established that the military criminal jurisdiction in democratic States, in times of peace, has tended to be reduced and even disappear; therefore, in the case of a State that conserves it, its use should be minimal, as strictly necessary, and shall be inspired by the principles and guarantees governing modern criminal law.87 In a democratic State the military criminal jurisdiction shall have a restrictive and exceptional scope and shall be channeled to protect special juridical interests, related to the functions of the military forces under the law. Hence, the Tribunal has already pointed out that military courts shall only hear cases of crime or faults by the military that attack, due to their nature, the juridical goods of the military order.88 109. Likewise, the Court has considered that the right to be tried by an ordinary court of justice pursuant to the proceedings legally set forth is a basic principle due process.89 Consequently, the Tribunal has pointed out that “when the military justice takes up competition in a matter that should be heard by ordinary justice, the right of the natural court is affected and, a fortiori, the due process”, which in turn is closely linked to the right of access to justice90. 110. To that end, in order to respect the right of the natural judge, the Tribunal has pointed out that it is not enough for the law to establish previously which tribunal shall hear the cause and grant it competence.91 Such law shall, when granting competence to a military court and determining the military criminal rules applicable in such court, establish clearly and without ambiguity: a) who is a service member, the only active subjects of military crimes; b) which are the typical criminal behaviors particular to the military forum; c) the unlawful conduct as demonstrated by the injury or how the military juridical goods have been seriously jeopardized, thus justifying the exercise of the military punitive power, and d) the corresponding punishment, taking into account the principle of proportionality. The authorities exercising their functions in the military criminal jurisdiction, when applying military criminal rules and accusing a military member of a crime shall also be governed by the principle of legality and, inter alia, shall confirm the existence of all the elements involved in the military criminal codification, as well as the existence or non-existence of the 87 Cf. Case of Palamara Iribarne, supra note 47, para. 132. 88 Cf. Case of Durand y Ugarte v. Peru. Merits. Judgment of August 16, 2000. Series A No. 68, para. 117; Case of Tiu Tojín v. Guatemala. Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment November 26, 2008. Series C No. 190, para. 118, and Case of Zambrano Vélez et al. v. Ecuador. Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment July 4, 2007. Series C No. 166, para. 66. 89 Cf. Case of Castillo Petruzzi et al., supra note 46, para. 129; Case of Palamara Iribarne, supra note 47, para. 125, and Case of Lori Berenson Mejía v. Peru. Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of November 25, 2004. Series C No. 119, para. 143. 90 Cf. Case of Castillo Petruzzi et al., supra note 46, para. 128; Case of Tiu Tojín, supra note 88, para. 118, and Case of Zambrano Vélez et al., supra note 88, para. 66. 91 Cf. Case of Palamara Iribarne, supra note 47, para. 125.