evident obligation of guarantee by the State. From that viewpoint, the fact that the exercise of the right to freedom of expression, as of any other right, is limited by other fundamental rights acquires special relevance. In this specific case, the right to honor is the main essential legal reference point to assess the limits, because it is expressly protected by the Convention in the same Article 13 (“respect for the rights or reputations of others”) and in Article 11 (“right to have his honor respected and his dignity recognized”). 11. The protection of honor established in Article 11 of the Convention, as is recognized, prohibits any arbitrary or abusive interference in the private life of the individual or unlawful attacks on his honor or reputation. This makes it legitimate for whoever considers that his honor has been harmed to have recourse to the judicial mechanisms that the State has established. Insofar as it is a human right protected by the Convention, the State has an analogous obligation to ensure it, so that the State is bound to ensure that the right to honor can be protected fully, making available to the individual the appropriate means to this end. In the context of this general protection of honor, so-called “objective honor” merits consideration, which is, essentially, the value that the others assign to the individual in question when the good reputation or standing he enjoys in his social environment is affected. 12. The important point is that, in the process of protecting and ensuring the right to honor, any dispute or contention arising from what could be considered an abusive exercise of the right to freedom of expression must be resolved in a way that leaves both rights adequately protected by an appropriate weighing up exercise. As is evident, in case of dispute, it corresponds and will correspond to the judicature to process this and decide it in the search for harmony between freedom of expression and other fundamental rights. In this weighing up exercise, it is possible to process and decide adequately disputes between rights such as the rights in cases such as this one. This means, essentially, that the circumstances of the case in dispute are assessed, not to conclude in the “preference” for one right over another, but rather to decide on specific aspects of the right or rights cited in order to delimit them appropriately in the specific case and so that they may both be protected. 13. Regarding the judicial mechanisms for the protection of honor that are legitimate according to the Convention, this Judgment merely reiterates the Inter-American Court’s consistent case law to the effect that “[b]oth the civil and the criminal jurisdiction are legitimate, under certain circumstances, and insofar as they meet the requirements of necessity and proportionality, as a means for the subsequent imposition of liability for the expression of information or opinions that affect honor or reputation” (para. 126). Thus, the Court reaffirms here that the protection of the honor and reputation of every individual is – in general and also in this case – a legitimate objective for the subsequent imposition of liability and that the criminal jurisdiction may be appropriate to safeguard the legal right that it is desired to protect, to the extent that it is able to contribute to achieving this objective. 14. In other cases decided previously by the Inter-American Court the facts submitted to the Court’s consideration consisted, among other elements, of phrases or opinions that allegedly harmed the right to honor of public officials. In those cases, based on the status as such of the individuals allegedly harmed and of the particular context in which they were issued (such as electoral processes or investigations into gross human rights violations), the Court determined that the State was internationally responsible because it had unduly impaired freedom of expression. Save for the differences between each case, this is a similar component in the cases of Ricardo Canese v. Paraguay (judgment of August 31, 2004), Palamara Iribarne v. Chile (judgment of November 22, 2005) and Kimel v. Argentina (judgment of May 2, 2008). 3