Europea exigen la criminalización de cualquier acto sexual no consentido, incluso en ausencia de resistencia física por parte de la víctima 145. Una vez establecido este parámetro, la Corte pasó a evaluar la legislación búlgara y concluyó que no contemplaba la penalización de todo acto no consentido y que el Estado no había demostrado que su poder judicial la interpretara en sentido amplio 146. En el caso, se consignó que las autoridades adoptaron puntos de vista estereotipados y discriminatorios al exigir pruebas de violencia, resistencia o gritos 147, con la Corte EDH elaborando entonces parámetros para la conducta de las autoridades en casos de violaciones: (…) it appears that the prosecutors did not exclude the possibility that the applicant might not have consented, but adopted the view that in any event, in the absence of proof of resistance, it could not be concluded that the perpetrators had understood that the applicant had not consented (…). The prosecutors forwent the possibility of proving the perpetrators' mens rea by assessing all the surrounding circumstances, such as evidence that they had deliberately misled the applicant in order to take her to a deserted area, thus creating an environment of coercion, and also by judging the credibility of the versions of the facts proposed by the three men and witnesses called by them (…). The Court considers that, while in practice it may sometimes be difficult to prove lack of consent in the absence of “direct” proof of rape, such as traces of violence or direct witnesses, the authorities must nevertheless explore all the facts and decide on the basis of an assessment of all the surrounding circumstances. The investigation and its conclusions must be centred on the issue of non-consent. That was not done in the applicant's case. The Court finds that the failure of the authorities in the applicant's case to investigate sufficiently the surrounding circumstances was the result of their putting undue emphasis on “direct” proof of rape. Their approach in the particular case was restrictive, practically elevating “resistance” to the status of defining element of the offence. The authorities may also be criticised for having attached little weight to the particular vulnerability of young persons and the special psychological factors involved in cases concerning the rape of minors 148. 75. El estudio realizado por la Corte EDH en este caso y sus conclusiones sirvieron de lastre para establecer las obligaciones de los Estados parte en la Convención sobre Prevención y Combate de la violencia contra las mujeres y la Violencia Doméstica (o "Convención de Estambul") de 2011 en relación con la tipificación de los delitos sexuales, cuyo artículo 36 incorpora el estándar de consentimiento reflejado en la Sentencia: (1) Parties shall take the necessary legislative or other measures to ensure that the following intentional conducts are criminalised: (a) engaging in non-consensual vaginal, anal or oral penetration of a sexual nature of the body of another person with any bodily part or object; (b) engaging in other non-consensual acts of a sexual nature with a person; (c) causing another person to engage in non-consensual acts of a sexual nature with a third person. (2) Consent must be given voluntarily as the result of the person’s free will assessed in the context of the surrounding circumstances 149. 76. Otro precedente paradigmático en la definición del consentimiento como parámetro adecuado para la violación sexual procede del Tribunal Penal Internacional para la ex Yugoslavia (“ICTY”, en la sigla en inglés) en el caso de Fiscal vs. Kunarac, Kovac 145 146 147 148 149 Ibid. Ibid., párr. 170, 173. Ibid., párr. 179. Ibid., párr. 180-3. Cfr. Sentencia, párr. 139. 26