focus my considerations on the second element of the offense: the conditions that must precede the sexual act for the conduct to be illicit. 61. As already noted, in Bolivia sexual acts committed through intimidation or violence or taking advantage of any circumstance that prevents the victim's resistance are considered "rape." Thus, the relevance of the parameter of the victim's resistance is highlighted, which requires the demonstration of the attempt to resist (overcome by intimidation or violence) or the inability to resist, even if the event occurred without the consent of the victim or in situations in which the victim could not resist or in which any resistance on the part of the victim could aggravate their situation. The application of this parameter was evident in the case of Ms. Losada. 62. Before Sentencing Court No. 4, the opening of the classification of "rape" to an evaluation of the victim's capacity for resistance gave rise to a series of inadequate and discriminatory testimonies and arguments about the victim. 116 Her character and her personal history guided the hearings more than E.G.A's own behavior, in a clear process of revictimization. 117 Similarly, the emphasis on a victim's capacity for resistance contained in Article 309 of the Penal Code made her position of vulnerability and the position of trust occupied by the abuser irrelevant to the court. The court's perception that Ms. Losada had the capacity to resist her cousin's attacks because she had a “strong personality” led Sentencing Court No. 4 to change the offense that should be analyzed from "rape" (which had been the petition of the Public Prosecution) to "statutory rape" and to analyze E.G.A's conduct on the basis that "seduction or deception" had occurred, which resulted in a reduction of the sentence. 118 According to the Court, “[t]hese stereotypes reinforce the misconceived and discriminatory idea that a victim of sexual violence has to be ‘weak’, appear ‘defenseless’, react or resist the aggression.” 119. 63. After the annulment of the first trial, the Public Prosecution again accused the prisoner before Sentencing Court No. 2 for the crime of "rape." On this occasion, the court incorporated E.G.A's conduct into the latter type and acquitted the accused due to lack of conclusive evidence that intimidation or violence existed at the time of the alleged sexual union. 120 In the Court's evaluation: This collegiate judicial body expressly held that it was necessary to prove the existence of physical violence or intimidation for the crime of rape to be established and, therefore, excluded the expert opinion on psychological coercion and evidence of Brisa's mental state (…) In that regard, the Sentencing Court No. 2 asserted that “it cannot affirm whether [the] sexual intercourse constituted a consensual relationship or sexual assault […] because,” among other factors, “the victim [did not] refer to what the intimidation behaviors were that made her yield to her attacker.” Thus, it is noted that, when examining the nature of the sexual relations existing between a 16-year-old girl and a 26-year-old adult man who represented an authority figure for her, evidencing an asymmetry of power between the two, and with whom she also had a relationship of trust, the Trial Court did not consider it relevant to focus on the existence or not of consent on the part of Brisa or on the existence of an environment of coercion, by virtue of which her consent 116 117 118 Cf. Brief of Pleadings, Motions and Evidence of November 20, 2020, p. 92. Cf. Judgment, para. 164-5. Ibid., para.121. As the Court stated, “Beyond the use of gender stereotypes as one of the bases of the decision, which will be analyzed below (infra section b.4), the Court warns that said reasoning demonstrates a flagrant lack of training and sensitivity regarding the particular circumstances in cases of sexual violence committed against a girl, especially in her home and by a person who held power over her and, consequently, the absence of a gender and childhood perspective when examining the case.” 119 Ibid., para. 164 120 Ibid., para. 153 20