(…) [the] incest has to be made visible, it has to be recognized as a crime in itself, as an aggravating circumstance, a girl who grows up in a family and has an uncle, a father, a stepfather, there should not be the question whether or not there was questioning, or an adult cousin, they are the adults, they are the ones who have to guide us, the ones who have to take care of us, for me, the fact that we have made incest so invisible, yes, we listen about rapes, in universities, we hear about rapes in schools, but where it happens most in my experience, 70% to 80% of girls who are victims of sexual violence is within the family environment, we have to make that visible, we have to put ourselves as a criminal code, that people know that this is a crime, that I can go to schools and tell them, children and adolescents, if an adult in your family touches you in a sexual way, that is a crime, whether you have not consented, or have consented, and all the explanation that I have to give is that it is a crime in itself, every child or adolescent has to grow up safe in their home. 217 115. I point out, however, that the adoption of an autonomous offense for incestuous rape could also be an adequate protection measure in some contexts if all the elements indicated in the judgment are considered, taking into account the nefarious nature of this crime and of the importance of protected legal rights. The argument in favor of the adoption of its own nomen juris in this specific case is not intended to delegitimize the possibility of adopting specific classifications of crime in American legal systems, but rather to reinforce that the adoption of a new offense is not strictly necessary in the current state of the Bolivian criminal legislation to achieve the desired objective of conferring greater visibility and a perception of seriousness to the crime. V. Conclusion 116. The judgment handed down by the Court in this case lent itself to addressing, in depth, the international responsibility of the State for violations of the rights to humane treatment, to a fair trial, to private and family life, to rights of the child, to equality before the law and to judicial protection pursuant to Articles 5(1), 5(2), 8(1), 11(2), 19, 24 and 25(1) of the Convention read in conjunction with Articles 1(1) and 2, as well as for non-compliance with the obligations derived from Articles 7(b), 7(c), 7(e) and 7(f) of the Convention of Belém do Pará, to the detriment of Ms. Losada, 218 conclusions with which I fully agree. 117. The prominence of the Court's role as interpreter and supervisor of the States Parties��� compliance with the Convention derives largely from the development, in each specific case, of a set of measures to repair, to the greatest extent possible, the damage suffered by the victim and prevent new victims from being subjected to similar situations, establishing, along these lines, a type of special, individualized and specific prevention, and another general, abstract and generic one. Thus, based on Article 63(1) of the Convention, the Court listed in the judgment the suitable and appropriate measures to repair the damage suffered by Ms. Losada, correcting the legislative and institutional deficits that contributed to the violation of her rights and that still put present and future victims of sexual crimes in Bolivia at risk. 118. In this context, this concurring opinion sought to reinforce the importance of two reparation measures adopted by the Court in the judgment: the effective introduction of the element of consent as a characterizer of the offense of "rape" in the Bolivian Criminal Code (which includes elimination of the offense of "statutory rape" from the legal statute) and the attribution of a nomen juris in the Criminal Code to incestuous 217 218 Cf. Statement of Brisa De Angulo Losada during the public hearing before the Court on March 29, 2022. Cf. Judgment, para. 172. 39