Justice operators implies that dismissal is due to fairly serious conducts, while the other sanctions may be used in the case of negligence or incapacity.98 118. In the present case, the Commission notes first of all that The Argentine State expressly indicated to the Commission that the Impeachment Jury, apart from being a political body, uses "political discretion" criteria when adopting decisions on whether or not a judge should remain in the judiciary. That assertion by the State is a sign that the control that the Impeachment Jury exercises is, at least in part, political, which is problematic where judges are concerned. This situation is even more problematic when, as the analysis below discloses, the grounds for disciplinary measures to be applied by a political body empowered to use political discretion in adopting decisions are considerably vague. Therefore, the supposedly legal component of the proceeding is based on criteria that certainly afford the Jury a wide margin of discretion. 119. In relation to the foregoing, the Commission notes that the grounds on which the alleged victim was charged and later dismissed were general in nature, and in some it was not possible clearly to establish specific conduct that constituted faults. Such was the case of grounds (e) and (f) regarding "incompetence" and "negligence," as well as failure to perform official duties “inherent to the post.” The Commission considers that the wording of those grounds leaves the punishing authority an excessive margin of discretion in determining what specific conduct matches such vague wording, leaving room for subjective appreciations. Thus, for example, the Commission finds that Mr. Rico could not have foreseen that "refusing to swear an oath of loyalty to the Buenos Aires flag” constituted a "reiterated failure to perform the official duties inherent to the post." The margin of discretion arising from the wording of the grounds is especially problematic in this case, since, as the State recognized, the Impeachment Jury bases its decisions on reasons of political expediency. Thus, on one hand, at least two of the three grounds applied were excessively broad in their wording and, on the other, the punishing authority was empowered to use its "political discretion." The Commission considers that this situation violated the principle of legality, which, as noted, should be strengthened in punitive proceedings against judges. 120. Second, the Commission finds that the reasoning provided for the decisions did nothing to correct the above-referenced lack of precision. As was mentioned in the section on proven facts, the reasoning for decisions adopted by the Impeachment Jury follows a particular formula, in that each of the nine members of the jury provides a separate answer to questions as to whether or not the act was proven and if it was consistent with the grounds invoked. In that section of the decision each member of the jury offered personal assessments on both aspects; that is, not only on the facts, but also how they were consistent with the aforesaid grounds. 121. The Commission notes that some members of the Impeachment Jury even provided “elaborations," “additions," or "dissents" with respect to the facts and the assessment of evidence. Thus, for example, in the response to question 12.1, "Is it proven that he has treated employees of this tribunal and lawyers improperly”? Judge Alfonsín said that "while it is true that mistreatment of his colleagues is not on the list of offenses with which he is charged, I mention it as a way of illustrating his erratic behavior evinced by his constant overreaction.” For his part, Judge Aldazabal said, “I would echo the reasons given by Dr. San Martín in his vote on this matter, with the sole dissent that I do not believe that it is suitably proven that the accused challenged Dr. Pastore to a fight outside the Tribunal.”99 122. The Commission underscores that the way in which the reasoning was presented in this case impaired the possibility of knowing with any clarity or certainty which facts the jury considered attested and why they were consistent with the disciplinary grounds that were considered proven. The Commission notes in that regard that each member of the 9-member jury had to answer 16 questions with various subquestions for each disciplinary ground, making a total of 68 questions per ground. Since there were 7 98 I/A Court H.R., Case of López Lone et al. v. Honduras. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of October 5, 2015, Series C No. 302, par. 199. 99Annex 5. Vote of the Impeachment Jury of June 15, 2000. Annex 3 to the initial petition of March 4, 2002.