criticism, which is justified by the public interest nature of the activities that they carry out, because they have been voluntarily exposed to a more demanding scrutiny and because they have an enormous capacity to controvert the information through their power of public dissemination”103. 82. On the other hand, the commission observes that State officials holding elective positions, in particular the Presidency of the Republic, have a greater possibility of disseminating, expressing, defending and even of replicating accusations that they consider unfair or offensive, since they attract the attention of the media and have the resources of the State to disseminate them. This is a particularly important element in the case under study, given that the Commission itself has verified in its monitoring tasks that the then President Correa had wide spaces in the media and at official events to defend his positions and even to refer to the journalists and the media. 83. As has been explained, in these types of cases, the Commission is responsible for analyzing, under a strict judgment of necessity, whether the measure imposed is authorized in light of the terms of Article 13.2 of the American Convention, that is to say: (a) it is defined in an express, exhaustive, precise and clear way through a law in a formal and material sense; (b) pursues compelling objectives authorized by the Convention; and (c) it is absolutely necessary in a democratic society to achieve those ends, and strictly proportionate to the purpose pursued104. 2. Tripartite test 2.1. Strict formulation of the provision establishing the limitation or restriction (legal provision) 84. Following the IACHR’s and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights doctrine, the requirement of legality means that the legal provision that creates a restriction on freedom of expression must be contained in a law in precise and clear terms105. The criminalization must be formulated "in an express, precise, exhaustive, and prior manner, even more so when criminal law is the most restrictive and severe means to establish responsibilities with respect to unlawful conduct, taking into account that the legal framework must provide legal security for the citizen”106. 85. The IACHR has referred to and emphasized that the norms that limit freedom of expression must be written with such clarity so that any effort at interpretation is unnecessary. In the Kimel v. Argentina case, the Inter-American Court determined that the criminalization of libel and insult offenses violated articles 13 and 9 of the American Convention, in relation to articles 1.1 and 2, because it was excessively ambiguous and broad107, and subsequently in the monitoring stage declared that the State had complied with the ruling when it reformed the criminal offences, specifying the element of intentionality of the crimes and delimiting the scope of application of the criminal norm in order to protect speeches referring to matters of public interest, among others108. 86. In the present case, by a complaint filed by the then President of the Republic of Ecuador Rafael Correa, the petitioners Emilio Palacio Urrutia (journalist), Carlos Nicolás Pérez Lapentti, César Enrique Pérez Barriga, and Carlos Eduardo Pérez Barriga (directors of the newspaper El Universo), as well as the legal IACHR. Annual Report 2009. Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. Chapter III (Inter-American Legal Framework of the Right to Freedom of Expression). OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 51. December 30, 2009. Para. 40. 103 IACHR. Report No. 4/7. Case 12.663. Merits. Tulio Alberto Álvarez. Venezuela. January 26, 2017, para. 64. Available at: http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/decisions/court/2017/12663FondoEn.pdf 104 IACHR. Report No. 4/7. Case 12.663. Merits. Tulio Alberto Álvarez. Venezuela. January 26, 2017, para. 65. Available at: http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/decisions/court/2017/12663FondoEn.pdf 105 IACHR. Report No. 4/7. Case 12.663. Merits. Tulio Alberto Álvarez. Venezuela. January 26, 2017, para. 65. Available at: http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/decisions/court/2017/12663FondoEn.pdf 106 The Court analyzed the formulation of Article 109, which provided that "insult or false accusation of an offense that gives rise to public action, shall be punished with imprisonment of one to three years," and Article 110, which provided that "he who dishonors or discredits another shall be punished with a fine of one thousand five hundred pesos to ninety thousand pesos or imprisonment from one month to one year," and found that "the deficient criminal regulation of this matter" in the configuration of the crime constituted a violation of Articles 9 and 13.1 of the American Convention. I/A Court H.R., Case of Kimel v. Argentina. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of May 2, 2008 Series C No. 177, paras. 64-67. 107 I/A Court H.R., Case of Kimel v. Argentina. Monitoring Compliance with Judgment. Order of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights of May 18, 2010, paras. 30-35. See also, Law 26.551, enacted on November 26, 2009, available at: http://infoleg.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/160000-164999/160774/norma.htm. 108 19