62 90. First, the Court considers it necessary to examine some of the statements made by the parties to this proceeding. A first series of statements refers to the innocence or guilt of Lori Berenson with regard to the crimes she allegedly committed in Peru. In this regard, the State declared that the alleged victim was guilty of having perpetrated serious crimes that fell within the purview of acts of collaboration with terrorism. 91. The Court is not empowered to rule on the nature and gravity of the crimes attributed to the alleged victim. It takes note of the State’s allegations on these points and states, as on previous occasions, that a State “has the right and the obligation to safeguard it own security,”210 and that it must exercise this within limits and according to procedures that permit both public safety and the fundamental rights of the individual to be protected. There is a widespread recognition of the primacy of the human rights, which the State may not disregard or harm.211 Nevertheless, the foregoing in no way justifies terrorist violence – whoever the protagonists – that harms individuals and society as a whole and merits the most energetic rejection. The Court emphasizes that its primordial function is to safeguard human rights in all circumstances.212 92. This Court is authorized to establish a State’s international responsibility as a result of human rights violations, but not to investigate and punish the conduct of State agents or third parties who may have taken part in these violations. A human rights court is not an organ of criminal justice. On other occasions, the Court has noted that it does not have competence to establish the criminal liability of the individual.213 This statement is applicable in the instant case. Consequently, the Court will determine the juridical consequences of the facts it considers proven. Also, within the framework of its competence, it will indicate whether or not the State is responsible for violating the Convention but abstain from examining the statements of the parties concerning the alleged criminal liability of the alleged victim, a matter that corresponds to the domestic courts. 93. The second series of statements refers to the brief submitted by the State on July 22, 2002, entitled “Demanda sobre el informe 36/02 de la Comisión Interamerican de Derechos Humanos” [Complaint regarding report 36/02 of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights] (supra para. 19), in which the State requested the Court to declare that Peru had complied with “the standards established in the Convention and the case law of the Court” in the trial of the Lori Berenson case in the domestic jurisdiction. 94. The Court does not deem it necessary to examine this claim in depth because, in an order issued on September 6, 2002, it decided to admit the Commission’s application and the State’s brief of July 22, 2002; the latter to be processed “within the same proceeding as the application submitted by the Commission” (supra para. 210 Cf. Case of Juan Humberto Sánchez. Judgment of June 7, 2003. Series C No. 99, para. 111; Case of Bámaca Velásquez. Judgment of November 25, 2000. Series C No. 70, para. 143 and 174; and Case of Durand and Ugarte. Judgment of August 16, 2000. Series C No. 68, para. 69. 211 Cf. Case of Castillo Petruzzi et al., supra note 25, para. 204. 212 Cf. Case of Castillo Petruzzi et al., supra note 25, para. 89. 213 Cf. Case of the Gómez Paquiyauri Brothers, supra note 16, para. 73; Case of Hilaire, Constantine and Benjamin et al.. Judgment of July 21, 2002. Series C No. 94, para. 66; and Case of Bámaca Velásquez, supra note 210, para. 98.