74 DINCOTE, without the presence of [Lori] Berenson’s lawyer and under pressure”; g) Neither Lori Berenson nor her defense lawyer were allowed to be present during “the preparation of the case file.” Nor were they allowed to submit any evidence in her favor, “including testimonies that could have helped her.” The alleged victim was not given the opportunity to address the judge, “except when she was asked [...] if she proposed to file an appeal”; h) The right to appeal did not comply with treaty-based standards, because it was not presented “before an instance with appropriate judicial characteristics; for example, an instance that complied with the concept of the ordinary judge […] and owing to the curtailment of the regular procedural guarantees”; i) The alleged victim was tried “by secret judges in military barracks, to which the public did not have access, and even on some procedural occasions, she could not be present during the presentation of her own lawyer’s arguments”; j) The judgment of the Supreme Council of Military Justice of August 18, 2000, and also of the Military Supreme Court of August 24, 2000, “declared the annulment of the judgment convicting Lori Berenson in the military jurisdiction, but did not declare the annulment of the preliminary investigation in that jurisdiction. Rather, a copy of the preliminary investigation was forwarded to the ordinary criminal jurisdiction”; and k) The judgments of the military courts that annulled the judgment sentencing the alleged victim re-examined the facts; “however, they did not call those exonerating judgments acquittals, but […] annulments”. 129(2) Regarding the trial before the civil court a) There was no “clear and definite separation” between the military trial and the trial in the civil court, because the probative evidence collected for the former had a “transcendental probative role” in the latter, since it “constituted the basis for opening the preliminary investigation” and “was the grounds on which [the alleged victim] was convicted”; b) “The standard of the inter-American human rights system should be the exclusion of any probative material or evidence obtained in violation of human rights.” Just as no one can be convicted if there is incomplete or insufficient evidence against them, “with more reason, no one can be convicted if the evidence against them is unlawful, because it has been obtained in violation of their human rights”; c) Even if the alleged victim’s defense lawyer had requested that the evidence collected in the military jurisdiction should be assessed in the ordinary criminal trial, “this would not alter the Peruvian State’s international responsibility, since the possible consent of the affected person does not validate violations to their human rights.” The alleged victim’s defense lawyer contested the use of the evidence collected in the military proceeding in the