85 143. The right to be judged by civil courts under legally established procedures constitutes a basic principle of due process of law. The State should not create “courts that do not apply duly established procedural norms in substitution of the jurisdiction that would normally correspond to the civil courts.”242 144. This Court has also stated that due process “entails the intervention of an independent and impartial judicial organ, having the power to determine the lawfulness of measures adopted in a state of emergency.”243 145. In a case such as this one, the impartiality of the judge is affected by the fact that the armed forces have the double function of combating the subversive groups with military means, and judging and imposing penalties on the members of these groups. On another occasion, this Court has indicated that: Under the Statute of Military Justice, members of the Supreme Council of Military Justice, the highest body in the military judiciary, are appointed by the minister of the pertinent sector. Moreover, members of the Supreme Court of Military Justice decide who among their subordinates will be promoted and what incentives will be offered to whom; they also assign their functions. This alone is enough to call the independence of the military judges into question.244 146. Consequently, the Court considers that the military tribunals that tried the alleged victim for treason did not meet the requirements implicit in the guarantees of independence and impartiality that Article 8(1) of the American Convention recognizes as essentials of due process of law.245 147. In addition, because judges who preside over the treason trials are “faceless,” defendants have no way of knowing the identity of their judges and, hence, of assessing their competence. Compounding the problem is the fact that the law does not allow these judges to be challenged.246 148. Furthermore, after declaring that the special appeal for review of res judicata was admissible, the Supreme Council of Military Justice transferred the main case records to the Supreme Military Tribunal, which delivered judgment on August 24, 2000 (supra para. 88(44)). 242 Case of Castillo Petruzzi et al., supra note 25, para. 129; Cf. Case of the 19 Tradesmen, supra note 239, para. 165; Case of Las Palmeras, supra note 239, para. 51; and Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, adopted by the Seventh United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders, held in Milan from August 26 to September 6, 1985, and confirmed by the General Assembly in resolutions 40/32 of November 29, 1985, and 40/146 of December 13, 1985. 243 Cf. Case of Tibi, supra note 3, para. 118; Case of Castillo Petruzzi et al., supra note 25, para. 131; Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations (arts. 27(2), 25(1) and 7(6) American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-8/87 of January 30, 1987. Series A No. 8, para. 30; and Judicial Guarantees in States of Emergency (Arts. 27(2), 25 and 8 American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-9/87 of October 6, 1987. Series A No. 9, para. 20. 244 Cf. Case of Cantoral Benavides, supra note 25, para. 114; and Case of Castillo Petruzzi et al., supra note 25, para. 130. 245 Cf. Case of Cantoral Benavides, supra note 25, para. 115; and Case of Castillo Petruzzi et al., supra note 25, para. 132. 246 Cf. Case of Cantoral Benavides, supra note 25, para. 127; and Case of Castillo Petruzzi et al., supra note 25, para. 133.