3 thus making it unnecessary for the inter-American jurisdiction, whose main purpose is precisely this re-establishment, to intervene.6 In other words, the rule of the prior exhaustion of domestic remedies operates in those situations in which the object and purpose of the Convention has not been achieved because the State concerned has failed to comply with its undertakings in this regard7 and, therefore, the intervention of the international jurisdictional organ is necessary so that, if appropriate, it can order the State to comply with the international obligations it has breached, to guarantee that it will not violate them again, and to make reparation for the consequences of such violations.8 This is why the Court indicates that “[t]he rule of prior exhaustion of domestic remedies was conceived in the interests of the State, because it seeks to exempt it from responding before an international organ for acts attributed to it, before it has had the opportunity to remedy them by its own means.”9 However, this assertion must be nuanced or complemented because, on the one hand, this rule is not included among the rights guaranteed by the Convention,10 but rather among the norms of the Convention concerning the mechanisms for the protection of those rights11 – in other words, among the provisions of a procedural nature – and, on the other hand, the rule was not solely and exclusively, or even mainly, conceived in order to serve the interests of the State, but fundamentally in order to achieve, as a practical effect, the most prompt and effective re-establishment of respect for human rights by the State. Consequently, this rule has also been established, perhaps primarily, for the benefit and use of the victim of a human rights violation. This is even more evident if the provisions of Article 25(1) of the Convention, transcribed above, are recalled concerning the right of everyone to judicial protection. In other words, since the rule of prior exhaustion of domestic remedies is of a procedural nature and, especially, since it is not among the rights recognized by the Convention, it cannot be understood, per se or prima facie, as a restriction to the enjoyment and exercise of those rights or, in any case, that this is not established in the Convention. 12 In other words, the pro homini principle will not always be applicable with regard to this rule, especially the aspects of it that are regulated by the organs of protection those rights and freedoms, without any discrimination for reasons of race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, economic status, birth, or any other social condition.” 6 Art. 63(1) of the Convention: “If the Court finds that there has been a violation of a right or freedom protected by this Convention, the Court shall rule that the injured party be ensured the enjoyment of his right or freedom that was violated. It shall also rule, if appropriate, that the consequences of the measure or situation that constituted the breach of such right or freedom be remedied and that fair compensation be paid to the injured party.” 7 Art. 33 of the Convention: “The following organs shall have competence with respect to matters relating to the fulfillment of the commitments made by the States Parties to this Convention: (a) the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, referred to as "the Commission;" and (b) the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, referred to as "the Court." 8 Art. 63(1) of the Convention, transcribed above. 9 Para. 15. 10 Part I of the Convention, “State Obligations and Rights Protected.” 11 Part II of the Convention, “Means of Protection.” 12 Art. 29 of the Convention: “Restrictions regarding Interpretation. No provision of this Convention shall be interpreted as: (a) permitting any State Party, group, or person to suppress the enjoyment or exercise of the rights and freedoms recognized in this Convention or to restrict them to a greater extent than is provided for herein; (b) restricting the enjoyment or exercise of any right or freedom recognized by virtue of the laws of any State Party or by virtue of another convention to which one of the said states is a party; (c) precluding other rights or guarantees that are inherent in the human personality or derived from representative democracy as a form of government; or (d) excluding or limiting the effect that the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man and other international acts of the same nature may have.”