16 detention, disappearance and death, the Court deems it necessary to evaluate their testimony in a broad sense in order to determine the effects and acts that occurred after March 9, 1987, and the possible violations of the American Convention. 47. Accordingly, the Court has stated that: [i]n the exercise of its judicial functions and when ascertaining and weighing the evidence necessary to decide the cases before it, the Court may, in certain circumstances, make use of both circumstantial evidence and indications or presumptions on which to base its pronouncements when they lead to consistent conclusions as regards the facts of the case... (Gangaram Panday Case, Judgment of January 21, 1994. Series C No. 16, para. 49). 48. The Commission argued in the petition that "[d]uring the time of Nicholas Blake's abduction, forced disappearance constituted a practice of the Guatemalan State carried out mainly by the State's security forces... against any persons suspected of involvement in subversive activities." As an illustration of the foregoing, the Commission cited the United Nations 1990 Report of Working Group on Enforced or Voluntary Disappearances, which refers to numerous cases of forced disappearances that occurred during the second half of the 1980s, and indicated that 2,990 cases in Guatemala remained unsolved. 49. The Court deems it possible for the disappearance of a specific individual to be demonstrated by means of indirect and circumstantial testimonial evidence, when taken together with their logical inferences, and in the context of the widespread practice of disappearances. In a case such as this, the Court has always maintained that a judgment can be based on evidence other than direct documentary and testimonial evidence. Circumstantial evidence, indications, and presumptions may also be admitted when they lead to consistent conclusions with regard to the facts. As this Court has stated previously: [c]ircumstantial or presumptive evidence is especially important in allegations of disappearances, because this type of repression is characterized by an attempt to suppress all information about the kidnapping or the whereabouts and fate of the victim. (Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Judgment of July 29, 1988. Series C No. 4, para. 131; Godínez Cruz Case, Judgment of January 20, 1989, Series C No. 5, para. 137). 50. As the Court has pointed out, the criteria for evaluation of evidence before an international human rights tribunal are broader, since determination of a State's international responsibility for human rights violation bestows greater flexibility on the Tribunal in assessing evidence delivered to it on the pertinent facts, on the basis of logic and experience (Loayza Tamayo Case, Judgment of September 17, 1997. Series C No. 33, para. 42; Castillo Páez Case, Judgment of November 3, 1997. Series C No. 34, para. 39). 51. In accordance with this critera, the Court attributes a high probatory value to the statements of the aforementioned witnesses, in the context and circumstances of a case of a forced disappearance with its attendant difficulties in which, owing to the very nature of the crime, proof essentially takes the form of indirect and circumstantial evidence. VII FACTS PROVEN 52. The Court now considers the following relevant facts, which it finds to be established on the basis of the arguments of the State and the Inter-American