61 the principle of presumption of innocence constitutes a foundation for judicial guarantees. The obligation of the State to not restrict the detainee’s liberty beyond the limits strictly necessary to ensure that he will not impede the efficient development of the investigations and that he will not evade justice derives from that established in Article 8(2) of the Convention. In this sense, the preventive detention is a cautionary measure and not a punitive one. This concept is laid down in multiple instruments of international human rights law. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides that preventive detention should not be the normal practice in relation to persons who are to stand trial (Article 9(3)). It would constitute a violation to the Convention to keep a person whose criminal responsibility has not been established detained for a disproportionate period of time. This would be tantamount to anticipating a sentence, which is 175 at odds with universally recognized general principles of law. 182. Finally, in the case of Article 7(6) of the Convention, the Inter-American Court has held that this particular provision has “its own legal content, which consists of the protection of personal or physical freedom, by means of a judicial decree ordering the appropriate authorities to bring the detained person before a judge so that the lawfulness of the detention may be determined and, if appropriate, the release of the detainee be ordered.”176 The Court has also written that the right established in Article 7(6) of the American Convention is not observed merely by the formal existence of the remedies it governs. “Those remedies must be effective, since their purpose, in the terms of Article 7(6), is to obtain without delay a decision "on the lawfulness of [his] arrest or detention," and, should they be unlawful, to obtain, also without delay, an "order [for] his release".177 The Inter-American Court has had previous occasion to write that delay in settling a petition for a writ of habeas corpus implies that that remedy is ineffective and thus a violation of Article 7(6) of the Convention.178 1.2 Provisional arrest in the context of an extradition process under the American Convention 183. Having summarized the relevant provisions of Article 7 of the American Convention, the IACHR must now determine how those standards apply to the practice of provisional arrest in an extradition process. Within the ambit of the Inter-American System of Human Rights, there is wide jurisprudence on the right to personal liberty179, including detailed standards on immigration 175 I/A Court H.R., Case of Acosta Calderón. Judgment of June 24, 2005. Series C No. 129, paragraph 111; Case of Tibi. Judgment of September 7, 2004. Series C No. 114, paragraph 180; and Case of Suárez Rosero. Judgment of November 12, 1997. Series C No. 35, paragraph 77. 176 I/A Court H.R., Case of Velez Loor v. Panama. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 23, 2010. Series C No. 218, paragraph 124. Cf. Habeas corpus in Emergency Situations (Arts. 27(2), 25(1) and 7(6) American Convention on Human Rights). Advisory Opinion OC-8/87 of January 30, 1987. Series A No. 8, paragraph 33. 177 I/A Court H.R., Case of Suárez Rosero. Judgment of November 12, 1997. Series C No. 35, paragraph 63. 178 See I/A Court H.R. Case of Suárez Rosero. 179 See. IACHR. Case Tibi Vs. Ecuador. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of 7 September 2004. Series C No. 114; Case Acosta Calderon Vs. Ecuador. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of 24 June 2005. Series C No. 129; Case Garcia Asto and Ramirez Rojas Vs. Peru. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of 25 November 2005. Series C No. 137; Case Barreto Leiva Vs. Venezuela. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgement of 17 November 2009. Series C No. 206.