42 strictly its application and scope, in order to reduce the application of the death penalty to bring about its gradual disappearance." 107 100) In light of the general spirit evident in Article 4 of the American Convention, considered in its entirety, the Court has found that: [t]hree types of limitations can be seen to be applicable to States Parties which have not abolished the death penalty. First, the imposition or application of this sanction is subject to certain procedural requirements whose compliance must be strictly observed and reviewed. Second, the application of the death penalty must be limited to the most serious common crimes not related to political offenses. Finally, certain considerations involving the person of the defendant, which may bar the imposition or application of the death penalty, must be taken into account. 108 101) The Court is aware of the pain and suffering inflicted upon the direct victims and their next of kin by the perpetrators in murder cases, and is cognizant of the State’s duty to protect potential victims of this crime, punish those responsible and generally maintain public order, which may be affected by the proliferation of these types of crimes. The Court also considers that the State’s struggle against murder should be carried out with the utmost respect for the human rights of the persons under their jurisdiction and in compliance with the applicable human rights treaties. 109 102) The intentional and illicit deprivation of another’s life (intentional or premeditated murder, in the broad sense) can and must be recognised and addressed in criminal law under various categories (criminal classes) that correspond with the wide range of gravity of the surrounding facts, taking into account the different facets that can come into play: a special relationship between the offender and the victim, motives for the behaviour, the circumstances under which the crime is committed, the means employed by the offender, etc. This approach allows for a graduated assessment of the gravity of the offence, so that it will bear an appropriate relation to the graduated levels of gravity of the applicable punishment. 103) The Court finds that the Offences Against the Person Act of 1925 of Trinidad and Tobago automatically and generically mandates the application of the death penalty for murder and disregards the fact that murder may have varying degrees of seriousness. Consequently, this Act prevents the judge from considering the basic circumstances in establishing the degree of culpability and individualising the sentence since it compels the indiscriminate imposition of the same punishment for conduct that can be vastly different. In light of Article 4 of the American Convention, 107 I/A Court H.R., Restrictions to the Death Penalty (Arts. 4(2) and 4(4) American Convention on Human Rights). Advisory Opinion OC-3/83 of September 8, 1983. Series A No. 3, para. 57. 108 I/A Court H.R., Restrictions to the Death Penalty (Arts. 4(2) and 4(4) American Convention on Human Rights). Advisory Opinion OC-3/83, supra note 107, para. 55. Likewise, the United Nations Human Rights Committee found that Article 6 (sections 2-6) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights implies that States Parties must limit the use of the death penalty, abolish it for all but the most serious crimes, and consider amending their criminal code in light of this purpose. Cf. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 6 (Sixteenth Session, 1982), para. 6, in Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 at 6 (1994). 109 Cf. I/A Court H.R., Bámaca Velásquez Case. Judgment of November 25, 2000. Series C No. 70, para. 174; I/A Court H.R., Durand and Ugarte Case. Judgment of August 16, 2000. Series C No. 68, para. 69; and I/A Court H.R., Castillo Petruzzi et al. Case, supra note 66, paras. 89 and 204.