52 145) It is the view of this Court that in certain cases a prolonged delay in itself can constitute a violation of the right to fair trial. In these situations, the State must provide, according to the above criteria (supra para. 143), an explanation and proof as to why it has needed more time than normally required to issue a final judgment in a particular case. 146) The Court ruled in its Advisory Opinion OC-16/99 that "for ‘the due process of law’ a defendant must be able to exercise his rights and defend his interests effectively and in full procedural equality with other defendants." 128 147) In this context, the Court has said that in order to ensure a veritable guarantee of the right to a fair trial, the proceedings must adhere to all the requirements that "are designed to protect, to ensure or to assert the entitlement to a right or the exercise thereof," 129 or rather, "the prerequisites necessary to ensure the adequate protection of those persons whose rights or obligations are pending judicial determination." 130 148) In order to protect the right to effective recourse, established in Article 25 of the Convention, it is crucial that the recourse be exercised in conformity with the rules of due process, protected in Article 8 of the Convention, which include access to legal aid. Taking into account the exceptionally serious and irreparable nature of the death penalty, the observance of due process, with its bundle of rights and guarantees, becomes all the more important when human life is at stake. 131 149) With respect to the right to effective recourse in this case, the Court considers that, according to the evidence presented by the Commission, it is evident that the filing of constitutional motions is complicated and difficult without the 128 Likewise, in the aforementioned Advisory Opinion (OC-16/99) the Court found that [t]o accomplish its objectives, the judicial process must recognize and correct any real disadvantages that those brought before the bar might have, thus observing the principle of equality before the law and the courts and the corollary principle prohibiting discrimination. The presence of real disadvantages necessitates countervailing measures that help to reduce or eliminate the obstacles and deficiencies that impair or diminish an effective defense of one’s interests. Absent those countervailing measures, widely recognized in various stages of the proceeding, one could hardly say that those who have the disadvantages enjoy a true opportunity for justice and the benefit of the due process of law equal to those who do not have those disadvantages. I/A Court H.R., The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees of the Due Process of Law. Advisory Opinion OC-16/99 of October 1, 1999. Series A No. 16, paras. 117 and 119. 129 I/A Court H.R., Habeas Corpus in Judicial Emergency Situations (Arts. 27(2), 25(1) and 7(6) American Convention on Human Rights). Advisory Opinion OC-8/87 of January 30, 1987. Series A No. 8, para. 25. 130 I/A Court H.R., Judicial Guarantees in States of Emergency (Arts. 27(2), 25 and 8 American Convention on Human Rights). Advisory Opinion OC-9/87 of October 6, 1987. Series A No. 9, para. 28; and I/A Court H.R., The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees of the Due Process of Law. Advisory Opinion OC-16/99, supra note 128, para. 118. 131 Cf. I/A Court H.R., The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees of the Due Process of Law. Advisory Opinion OC-16/99, supra note 128, paras. 134 and 135.