the Commission follows the Court’s jurisprudence, the instant case would remain within the jurisdiction of the national courts. 25. The State also rejects the petitioners’ description of the war in El Salvador, as it induces a priori judgments. The State adds that during the armed conflict, some groups orcampesino populations lived with the guerrilla movement or helped it to survive. The State reasons, therefore, that it is only logical that the Army’s operations should result in unfortunate fatalities. 26. The Salvadoran State contends that there was no pattern of forced disappearance during the period of the armed conflict, and that if the children were the victims of such disappearances, the State is not to blame since no such order was given to its Armed Forces; in fact, the State contends that an effort was made to get the children to safety. The State also asserts that it was not the policy of the government to change the children’s identity and put them up for adoption; if private individuals were engaging in these criminal activities, there were and are mechanisms under the criminal justice system to establish blame. Based on this information, the State is requesting the IACHR to find that “forced disappearance of children was not systematic practice on the part of the Salvadoran Armed Forces.” 27. As for the petitioners’ allegations concerning the military operations during which the Bonilla and Ayala children were alleged to have disappeared, the State contends that it has no information that would enable it to corroborate these facts. 28. As for the exhaustion of domestic remedies, the State argues that the petitioners have not exhausted remedies responsive to their complaint. The State observes that the Salvadoran legal system had and has various mechanisms by which one can assert one’s rights. The State makes specific mention of one such mechanism, i.e., a criminal complaint. It argues that the next of kin of the disappeared children never filed such a criminal complaint, which was always available to them since the courts were everywhere in the country and had jurisdiction in each of the departments, municipalities, towns, villages and cantons. 29. The State observes that the petitioners decided to avail themselves of the remedy of habeas corpus 20 years after the facts occurred. It notes that the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court dismissed the two petitions of habeas corpus on March 6 and May 26, 2003, on the grounds that evidence and information regarding the alleged disappeared children were lacking.10 The State adds that the earlier decisions did not constitute res judicata for the regular courts, so that nothing prevents the petitioners or any other interested party from requesting a new habeas corpus proceeding to have the court authorities grant protection of the right to liberty; nor is there anything to prevent them from turning to the courts through a criminal or constitutional action.11 30. The State adds that had the petitions of habeas corpus been filed earlier, more information could have been gathered. The State also believes that the arguments and evidence that the petitioners introduced to make their case with the Supreme Court seeking a finding on the disappearance of the boys Manuel Antonio Bonilla and Ricardo Ayala Abarca were not very clear. 31. The State alleges further that the petitioners could have filed a series of alternative remedies, either with El Salvador’s Governmental Human Rights Commission or the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which established a permanent delegation in 10 In this regard, according to the State, the Constitutional Chamber held that “since none of the evidence -– circumstantial or otherwise-- typically associated with forced disappearance has been shown, the court has no crime on which to rule; forced disappearance consists of an unlawful or arbitrary restriction of personal liberty.” 11 In this regard, the IACHR observes that in decisions dated March 3, 2003 and May 26, 2003, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court wrote that “the foregoing does not prevent the petitioner or any other interested party armed with the evidence referred to in this resolution, from requesting a new habeas corpusproceeding to petition the court seeking protection of the right to physical liberty of the person on whose behalf the petition is filed.” 5