14 "(...) It has been proven that the present case of Goiburú et al. is inserted in a policy of State terrorism that victimized, in the cruelest and most brutal way possible, thousands of people and their next of kin in the countries that prepared the Condor Operation, in which gross violations of human rights were even committed ‘extraterritorially’, in other countries and other continents. How can we deny the existence of the Crime of State before a State policy of extermination? The crime of State does not only exist in the head of the ‘illuminated’ experts on international law that dogmatically affirm that the State simply cannot commit a crime. They continue ignoring episodes such as those of the present case, historically proven, and other cases of massacres awarded by the Inter-American Court (cases, v.g. of the Barrios Altos Massacre, of the Plan de Sánchez Massacre, of the 19 Merchants, of the Mapiripán Massacre, of the massacre of the Moiwana Community, of the Pueblo Bello Massacre, of the Ituango Massacres), and murders planned at the highest level of state power (cases, v.g. of Barrios Altos, and of Myrna Mack Chang), even having today the acknowledgment of international responsibility by the respondent governments for their occurrence. Something does not stop existing simply because one states it does not exist. The experts in international law cannot remain indifferent to human suffering, which can be concluded from facts historically proven. While the contemporary doctrine on international law insists on denying what has been historically proven – the crimes of State – it will be eluding a matter of the greatest seriousness, with its juridical consequences, compromising its own credibility. (...)" (paras. 23-25) 52. In my opinion, those responsible for the exclusion in 2000 of the conception of “crime of State” from the Articles on the State’s Responsibility of the Commission on International Law of the United Nations (adopted in 2001) failed International Law. They did not realize – or they did not worry about the fact – that said notion leads to the “progressive development” itself of International Law. It supposes the existence of rights both previous and superior to the State, whose violation, in detriment of human beings, is especially gross and damaging to the international legal system itself. It provides the latter with universal values, by inhibiting said gross and damaging violations, and seeking to ensure the international ordre juridique. 53. Similarly, it gives expression to the belief that certain behaviors – that make up, or are part of a state policy – are inadmissible, and suddenly generate aggravated international responsibility of the State, with its juridical consequences. It points out the road toward the construction of an organized international community, of the new jus gentium of the XXI century, of International Law for humanity. 54. Contrary to what the experts in international law seem to want to achieve by remaining attached to obscurantism (in its unconditional defense of what the State’s do), the existence of the crime of State is empirically proven. Its occurrence is much more frequent than what one would hope. The XX century as a whole and the beginning of the XXI century have been tragically full of crimes of State. And the contemporary International Law cannot remain indifferent to this. 55. The crime of State effectively brings about juridical consequences – as should be, - with a direct incidence on the reparations due to the victims and their next of kin. A consequence consists in the “punitive damages” lato sensu, conceived these, beyond the merely pecuniary meaning inadequately attributed to them (in certain national jurisdictions), as specific obligations of reparation that must be assumed by the States responsible for criminal acts or practices, all of these obligations that may be considered an appropriate response or reaction of the legal system against the crime of State. 43 . N.H.B. Jorgensen, The Responsibility of States for International Crimes, Oxford, University Press, 2003, pp. 231 and 280. 43