that is to say; it would be like admitting that the D.G.I. would have to be accountable for eminently political acts of the Executive Branch itself.74 2.1. Appeals filed by Juan José Preckel 53. In the case brought by Mr. Preckel, he appealed the ruling of the Federal Judge, arguing that, outside of Circular 5/77, there are “very specific grounds that would enable payment for services not performed,” as would be detention by State’s agents without opening investigation proceedings against him.75 He contended that, additionally, said circular did provide for payment of wages lost for absences when a provision of law exists to allow it.76 He further alleged that the Rules on Leaves of Absence, Justifications and Exemptions of the National Public Administration specifically allows payment of said wages for reasons of force majeure, as the arbitrary detention he endured would be.77 54. On November 24, 1992, the Chamber of Appeals upheld the ruling of the trial court, noting that “payment of wages for services not provided is not proper” and that the provisions of law cited by the claimants would belong to the rules on leaves of absence, justifications, [which are] circumstances obviously different from the ones on the record in the case proceedings.78 It also concluded that it was not the responsibility of the General Tax Directorate, a self-governing entity of the State, to bear the burden of the redress for damages stemming from the potential unlawful conduct of the National Executive Branch.79 55. On that same day, Mr. Preckel filed a motion for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court.80 Mr. Preckel alleged that Article 14.c of the Regulation on Leaves of Absence, Justifications and Exemptions of the National Public Administration and Article 192.a of Collective Labor Agreement No. 46/75E declare “the right of agents to justification and collection of wages for absences they have had in instances of properly proven force majeure.”81 He contended that the provisions cited constituted an exception to Circular 5/77 and should be applied in the instant matter.82 56. On March 4, 1993, the Administrative Claims Chamber denied Mr. Preckel’s motion for leave to appeal.83 The Chamber held that Mr. Preckel confined himself “to disagree with the assessment of [the appealed decision], without realizing that it was sufficient prima facie to disqualify the appealed ruling as a jurisdictional act because of the seriousness of the mistakes that are attributed to it.”84 74 Ruling of the Federal Judge, February 12, 1992. Judicial proceedings. Annex to initial petition on Elba Clotilde Perrone. Ruling of the Federal Judge, February 6, 1992. Judicial proceedings. Annex to initial petition on Juan Preckel. 75 Undated appeal. Judicial proceedings. Annex to initial petition on Juan Preckel. 76 Undated appeal. Judicial proceedings. Annex to initial petition on Juan Preckel. 77 Undated appeal. Judicial proceedings. Annex to initial petition on Juan Preckel. 78 Judgment of the Chamber of Appeals, November 24, 1992. Judicial proceedings. Annex to initial petition on Juan Preckel. 79 Judgment of the Chamber of Appeals, November 24, 1992. Judicial proceedings. Annex to initial petition on Juan Preckel. 80 Motion for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, December 24, 1992. Judicial proceedings. Annex to initial petition on Juan 81 Motion for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, December 24, 1992. Judicial proceedings. Annex to initial petition on Juan 82 Motion for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, December 24, 1992. Judicial proceedings. Annex to initial petition on Juan 83 Judgment of the Administrative Claims Chamber, March 4, 1993. Judicial proceedings. Annex to initial petition on Juan 84 Judgment of the Administrative Claims Chamber, March 4, 1993. Judicial proceedings. Annex to initial petition on Juan Preckel. Preckel. Preckel. Preckel. Preckel. 11