4 address precisely the aforementioned issue of the establishment of the moment of emergence of the international responsibility of the State. 12. As I pointed out in a study on the subject, published in Geneva in 1978, over the last decades attempts to codify the matter, international jurisprudence, international doctrine and international practice have demonstrated a clear division between two theses, the substantive and the procedural ones (according to which State responsibility is, or is not, respectively, contingent upon reparations in domestic law). Combinations of these two theses, and of other explanatory theories (such as that of complex international wrongdoing, of dédoublement fonctionnel, of the rule of conflict and of the rule of policy) ultimately tend to converge toward the basic dichotomy between the substantive and procedural theses.10 13. Both in that study and in others I have always insisted on the need to establish a distinction between the emergence and the implementation (enforcement, mise-en-oeuvre) of the international responsibility of the State. In the sphere of responsibility of the State for damages caused to foreigners, the rule of domestic remedies has often been given a substantive nature (especially in the practice of several States), perhaps due to its preventive nature vis-à-vis discretional exercise of diplomatic protection; instead, in the sphere of international protection of human rights, the formulation of said rule takes on the form of a procedural condition of admissibility of international claims or petitions11 (integrating domestic remedies in the international process of reparation of human rights violations). 14. This being so, in my opinion there can be no doubt that, in International Human Rights Law, the international responsibility of the State arises at the very moment of violation of the rights of the human person, that is, as soon as the international wrongful act attributable to the State occurs. In the framework of the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights, the international responsibility of the State may be generated by acts or omissions of any branch or body or agent of the State, whatever its or his hierarchy, that violates the rights protected by the Convention.12 This has been the clear understanding of the Inter-American Court, which today constitutes its jurisprudence constante on the matter.13 15. Yet despite the clarity of the matter, unfortunately there has continued to be controversy, as I mentioned in my Separate Opinion (para. 4) in the Myrna Mack versus Guatemala case (2003), about the very moment of emergence of the responsibility of the State (perhaps due to the different contexts in which the rule of domestic remedies has been invoked14), - and this can be seen in the various 10 . See A.A. Cançado Trindade, "The Birth of State Responsibility and the Nature of the Local Remedies Rule", 56 Revue de droit international de sciences diplomatiques et politiques - Sottile (1978) pp. 157-188. 11 . Ibid., p. 176. 12 . See Inter-American Court of Human Rights (I-A Ct of HR), case of “The Last Temptation of Christ” versus Chile, Judgment of 05.02.2001, Series C, n. 73, p. 47, para. 72; and see Concurring Opinion of Judge A.A. Cançado Trindade, p. 76, para. 16, and see pp. 85-87, paras. 31-33. 13 . See I-A Ct of HR, case of the “Street Children” (Villagrán et al. versus Guatemala, Merits), Judgment of 19.11.1999, Series C, n. 63, p. 89, para. 220; I-A Ct of HR, case of the “Five Pensioners” versus Peru, Judgment of 28.02.2003, Series C, n. 98, para. 163; I-A Ct of HR, Case of Juan Humberto Sánchez versus Honduras, Judgment of 07.06.2003, Series C, n. 99, para. 142. 14 Such as the fundamentally different contexts of international protection of human rights and diplomatic protection.