13. According to the petitioners, in the preparation of that plenary opinion a serious act of institutional corruption had occurred that called the Forensic Medical Corps into question—they termed it a “most serious act with unimagined institutional ramifications”; they alleged that a false plenary opinion had been prepared with the aim of concealing the responsibilities of the professionals implicated in the homicide and in the preparation of the previous false expert opinions. Indeed, according to the petitioners, on September 23, 1997, the Fourth Chamber of the Criminal Court of Appeals invalidated the plenary opinion of the 31 members of the Forensic Medical Corps. The petitioners point out the serious institutional implications of that decision, given that the Argentine judiciary had decided to dispense with the services of the entire Forensic Medical Corps, a body that reported to the Supreme Court of Justice, owing to the “corrupt” and “corporative” behavior of its members intended to aid and abet their colleagues. 14. On November 10, 1997, the judge ordered a new expert opinion, this time entrusting it to the Catholic University of the Province of Córdoba. That institution issued its expert opinion in March 1998, attesting that the alleged victim had died of preeclampsia-eclampsia. This opinion, which was introduced into the record as expert evidence, found, inter alia, that the preeclampsia had not been properly diagnosed, that no treatment had been instituted, that the alleged victim had not been offered minimum recommendations, that she had not been correctly evaluated during her antenatal checkups, and that she had not been correctly medicated. The petitioners said that it was “astounding,” therefore, that the “incisive report” submitted by the Catholic University of Córdoba should have been used as grounds to acquit forensic experts Florencio Casavilla and Carlos Fernando Leoncio Poggi. Petitioners indicate that the decision was upheld by the Criminal Court of Appeals on October 21, 2002. 15. The petitioners pointed out that, contrary to what the State claimed in one of its additional comments to the IACHR, the presiding judge in the case had been recused. That recusal had been interposed on April 13, 1998, owing to “unwarranted delays” that could have resulted in the case being time-barred. They further noted that the judge had failed over the course of 41 months to direct the preliminary inquiry to its conclusion because of “the judge’s vested interest in the proceeding” and because of his “prejudgment.” They said that said recusal was rejected on June 18, 1998. 16. In that regard, they alleged that there was corporate machinery in place in Argentina that involved the Forensic Medical Corps, which ensured impunity for medical personnel when any of their members were involved in cases such as this. That corrupt machinery had denied the petitioners access to justice in the form of an impartial and duly founded decision. In that same regard, the petitioners add that the foregoing constituted proof that there was indeed external pressure on the judges and a lack of impartiality. Similarly, they said that the unique particularities of this case directly involved the Supreme Court itself, given that in the framework of the aforesaid investigation there had occurred the “historic act” in which, for the first time in Argentine judicial history, an expert opinion prepared by the plenary of the forensic corps of the country’s highest tribunal had been invalidated. 17. Finally, the petitioners say that although the expert opinion offered by the plenary of the Forensic Medical Corps was declared void due to the corruption of its members, a number of proceedings and decisions were based on that evidence—and on other pieces of evidence that had also been challenged—, which constituted use of unlawfully obtained proof. They also say that influence was brought to bear on all of the judicial decisions connected with that plenary opinion in related cases in order to obtain dismissals and acquittals for the members of the Forensic Medical Corps. c. Criminal proceeding for aiding and abetting after the fact (Case No. 43.321/97) 18. The petitioners say that their lawyers had received an anonymous tip off that was brought to the attention of the judicial authorities, as a result of which, on May 23, 1997, an investigation was initiated for aiding and abetting after the fact. The petitioners say that in the context of that investigation testimony was received from one of the dissenting medical doctors in the plenary opinion in case 21.375/96, who allegedly declared that there had been no deliberation whatsoever in drawing up the aforementioned plenary expert 3