79 violated Article 8(2)(b) of the Convention, in combination with Article 1(1) of that same instrument; e) Daniel Tibi did not have access to an attorney from the time of his detention. In this regard, he stated that “during the first month of his detention he did not have access to an attorney, but he did after that,” and that his first attorney was not Colón Delgado, as the State argues, but rather Nelson Martínez, with whom he “met in November 1995;” f) the Political Constitution of Ecuador requires that no one be interrogated, even for investigative purposes, by the police or any other agent, without the assistance of a defense counsel, chosen by the person or appointed by the State, if the person is unable to choose his own attorney. In the statement by the alleged victim before the Public Prosecutor on September 28, 1995, there is no signature of any person identifying himself as his attorney; g) the State is responsible for violation of Mr. Tibi’s right, embodied in Article 8(2)(d) and 8(2)(e) of the American Convention, to be assisted by an attorney of his choice or a State-appointed attorney, if he is financially unable to hire one; and h) the objective of the torture inflicted on Mr. Tibi, according to his testimony, was to force him to plead guilty in connection with drugtrafficking, in open violation of Article 8(2)(g) and 8(3) of the Convention. Pleadings of the representatives of the alleged victim and his next of kin 165. The representatives of the alleged victim and his next of kin pointed out that they concur with the Commission regarding State responsibility for violation of Article 8 of the Convention. Nevertheless, they made some additional comments: a) the State disregarded the right to be tried within a reasonable time, set forth in Article 8(1) of the Convention; b) the Ecuadorian Courts ordered provisional dismissal of the proceeding and of the charges against the accused in the case against Mr. Tibi, which, pursuant to Article 249 of the Criminal Procedures Code, means that “its substantiation is suspended for five years,” in the case of the proceeding, and in the case of provisional dismissal of charges against the accused, they are “suspended for three years.” Suspension of this proceeding continues to affect the situation of the alleged victim because there is the possibility of reopening it. The proceeding continued until January 14, 2001, the date on which quashing of the indictment should have been ordered ex officio. This is clearly unreasonable; c) the judicial authorities were negligent, as they did not comply with the legal periods for processing of a criminal trial; d) excessive duration of Mr. Tibi’s preventive incarceration entails a violation of the presumption of innocence. The Ecuadorian authorities kept an innocent person in jail based exclusively on the pre-trial statement of a co-