2 right to fair trial, indispensable for their protection. 5. Paragraph 1 of Article 8, invoked in the Case of Palamara-Iribarne, to which Judgment I attach this Opinion, sets forth a rule of general scope in this area, to wit: every person has the right “to a hearing with due guarantees and within a reasonable time, by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal, previously established by law (…)”. For functional reasons I consider evident, this is a guiding guarantee or, even better, conditioning of the aggregate of guarantees set forth in Article 8, with a very broad scope in the most different aspects of the trial. The provision of the Article above gains meaning and effectiveness under the protection of the rule which establishes the right to a hearing under qualified conditions. 6. As we already know, there is not a comprehensive and unanimously accepted description of due process, with regard to which other concepts are brought to discussion –synonymic or bordering concepts, a relation that I shall not analyze now –, such as effective legal protection or fair trial. Thus, it is usual to mention a series of rights, concepts or institutions on this matter, among which the demand for a trial before a legally established jurisdictional body which additionally has the characteristics of impartiality and jurisdiction stated in the above mentioned paragraph 1 of Article 1 of the American Convention on Human Rights is invariably present. 7. It is possible – and even necessary, in my opinion- to establish a certain division between this guarantee on the court, which I have called “guiding” or “conditioning”, and the remaining guarantees of that same Article 8, paragraphs 1 and 2, as well as those of other provisions of the American Convention. In order for these to operate, the complete and strict observance of the above mentioned guarantee is required; that is why it is considered to be guiding and conditioning. So, it seems reasonable to award to the existence of the judge or court the characteristic of the requirement of due process, and not only that of a component or element of the latter. In fact, it is precedent to the other rights which may be characterized in this last manner. 8. If we talk about proper defense, right to remain silent, remedy for the complete revision of the judgment, etc., it is supposed that all that is relevant precisely when a set of procedural acts is developed before the judicial authority of paragraph 1, which in this way constitutes the institutional or organic context, or the hypothesis or grounds for the presentation of the other rights. Of course, this does not prevent the demand for the observance of the due process guarantees when other authorities –not strictly judicial or jurisdictional- fulfill functions out of which the acknowledgement or disregard of rights or obligations shall be derived. In this case there is an extension of the concept and scope of due process of law, so as to address with realism and efficiency the protection purposes it pursuits. 9. Article 8(1) sets forth the characteristics of the settler (in the material sense, not only in the formal sense) summoned to decide an adversarial case and before whom the proceedings subjected to the guarantees system specified in the same provision must be developed: a) legally established, that is, his powers shall derive from the law which creates him or, in any case, from a law preventing them, considering the genuine scope of the expression “law”, a topic which has also been addressed by the Inter-American Court jurisprudence;