39 rather were required to appear at the Tribunal whenever they were summoned. He also reconfirmed the restrictions on all the accused. Had he decided on preventive imprisonment, he would have had to complete the investigation in 15 days, since the pertinent legislation required the judge to decide whether the accused would go free or a criminal proceedings would be opened within 15 days after an order of preventive imprisonment. Some of the accused, who sought unconditional release ("libertad simple"), appealed the decision. The case was referred to the Tenth Chamber of the Court of Appeal, which, on October 18, revoked his decisions and ordered the unconditional release of the accused. VIII EVALUATION OF THE EVIDENCE 69. Prior to the examination of the evidence received, the Court specifies the general criteria for the evaluation of evidence in this case, most of which were developed on the basis of this Tribunal’s jurisprudence. 70. In an international tribunal such as the Court, whose aim is the protection of human rights, the proceeding possesses its own characteristics that differentiate it from the domestic process. The former is less formal and flexible than the latter, which does not imply that it fails to ensure the parties’ legal security and procedural balance. 71. At the same time, it must be remembered that the international protection of human rights should not be confused with criminal justice. In cases in which States appear before the Tribunal they do so not as defendants in a criminal case, since the Court does not punish those guilty of human rights violations. Its function is to protect the victims and to determine the reparation of damages resulting from the acts by the States responsible (Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Judgment of July 29, 1988. Series C No. 4, para. 134; Suárez Rosero Case, Judgment of November 12, 1997. Series C No. 35, para. 37). 72. In addition to direct evidence, -whether it be personal, expert or documental-, international tribunals and domestic courts may base judgments on circumstantial evidence, indications or presumptions provided that they lead to sound conclusions in regards to the facts. In this respect, the Court has previously stated that in the exercise of its jurisdictional functions and when ascertaining and weighing the evidence necessary to decide the cases before it, the Court may, in certain circumstances, make use of both circumstantial evidence and indications or presumptions on which to base its pronouncements when they lead to consistent conclusions in regards the facts (Gangaram Panday Case, Judgment of January 21, 1994. Series C No. 16, para. 49; see also Loayza Tamayo Case, Judgment of September 17, 1997. Series C No. 33, para. 42; Castillo Páez Case, Judgment of November 3, 1997. Series C No. 34, para. 39; Blake Case, Judgment of January 24, 1998. Series C No. 36, para. 49). 73. In the instant Case the Court, with full discretion, admitted most of the evidence -documentary, personal and expert- offered to it by the parties; it even ordered some probative elements it deemed necessary. Those that were presented extemporaneously and without justification by the State were rejected on the basis of clear statutory provisions (Article 43 of the Rules of Procedure). 74. With regard to the objection which, for a variety of reasons, the State raised to some witnesses and experts, the normal practice of this Court, unlike that of the