12 any criminal action against those crimes is time-barred […]” It also argues that there is a time bar on any legal action against criminal association as well, because “even though the law prescribes that the crime is actually committed when the perpetrator is a member of an association [,thus] its execution continues as long as the membership status is active, the evidence refers to the time of the events (1971 to 1973), so the criminal action is timebarred.” Regarding the crimes of concealment and adding and abetting, the judgment states that “they lack the characteristics of crimes of continuing commission and that they [are] instant crime[s],” so any criminal action against them is also time-barred. As far as the crime of murder is concerned, the judgment notes that “there is no evidence of actual death[, so the court] should consider that up to date [José Carlos Trujillo-Oroza, and others] are subjected to unlawful deprivation of freedom.” Therefore, the judgment only admitted the exercise of the criminal action against the crime of unlawful deprivation of freedom, for being a crime of continuing commission. The Tribunal observes that in the second instance judgment the court found that “[a]s no Bolivian law defines the crime of forced disappearance of persons, the recommendation of paragraph 95 [of the Judgment of the Inter-American Court] was applied, insofar ´the offense shall be deemed continuous or permanent as long as the fate or whereabouts of the victim has not been determined.´” 45. That, as already stated by the Tribunal in this Order (supra Considering clause No. 36,) the crime of forced disappearance of persons should be analyzed as forming part of the set of constituting violations.20 In this sense, the Court is concerned about the fact that the State has judged the crimes committed in the instant case on a separately basis, independently of one another, thus dismembering the case and disregarding the wholeness of the events constituting a grave violations of human rights. As previously affirmed in this Order (supra Considering clause No. 38,) since the crime of forced disappearance of persons was incorporated into the criminal law of the State in 2006, it is applicable to the instant case for being a continuous and permanent crime. 46. That, according to the Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons, “the acts constituting [this conduct] shall be considered offenses in every State Party.”21 Furthermore, the Convention stipulates that "[c]riminal prosecution for the forced disappearance of persons and the penalty judicially imposed on the perpetrators shall not be subject to statutes of limitations."22 Hence, the application of the statute of limitations to acts amounting to forced disappearance of persons is an express breach of the obligations undertaken in said convention and the American Convention. 47. That this Tribunal, in the Judgment on reparations and costs referred above (supra Having Seen clause No. 2,) determined that all provisions regarding the statute of limitations and the establishment of measures designed to eliminate responsibility are 20 Cf. Case of Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras. Merits. Judgment of July 29, 1988. Series C No. 4, paras. 149-153; Case of Godínez-Cruz v. Honduras. Merits. Judgment of January 20, 1989. Series C No. 5, paras. 157161; and Case of Fairén-Garbi and Solís-Corrales v. Honduras. Merits, Judgment of March 15, 1989. Series C No. 6, para. 146, and Case of the Serrano-Cruz Sisters v. El Salvador Preliminary Objections. Judgment of November 23, 2004. Series C No. 118, para. 100. 21 Article IV of the Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons, adopted in Belém do Pará, Brazil, on June 9, 1994, during the twenty-fourth regular session of the General Assembly of the Organization of American States. 22 Article VII of the Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons, adopted in Belém do Pará, Brazil, on June 9, 1994, during the twenty-fourth regular session of the General Assembly of the Organization of American States.