8 26. That the Inter-American Commission referred to the fact that “on appeal, this insecurity pattern of denial of justice is recurrent, as it happened in the first instance proceedings when the appointed judges excused themselves from hearing the case.” The Commission expressed its concerns “about the lack of guarantees on the eligibility of a civil or commercial judge to conduct criminal proceedings involving a crime as the one of the instant case.” Furthermore, it pointed out that the “concerns” are solely about the “eligibility” of civil judges to hear criminal cases and that on this issue no satisfactory explanation has been furnished, for “[…] although there is […] legislation authorizing a civil judge to hear criminal cases, this is not a minor criminal matter, […] as it is a forced disappearance case.” 27. That the Court notes that the criminal proceedings have been submitted to a judge whose jurisdiction is exclusively civil or commercial and who has been officially authorized, through an excuse process, to hear a criminal case. Hence, even though the State has referred to the formal jurisdiction of civil or commercial judges to hear the criminal case involving the forced disappearance of Trujillo-Oroza, it has failed to adequately explain how this is consistent with the due process guarantees enshrined in the American Convention. In this sense, the Court considers that the fact that the procedure prescribed in the domestic laws on excuses and challenges of judges has been followed, this does not secure by itself compliance with those guarantees. To this respect, the Commission noted that the issue of the “eligibility” of a civil judge to hear a criminal case is clearly and specifically important in the instant case. 28. That regarding the excessive and arbitrary use of excuses as acknowledged by the State (supra Considering clause No. 23,) the Court emphasizes that the fines failed to reflect the gravity of the situation. Moreover, as acknowledged by the State, the Court is concerned about the lack of legal provisions forbidding judges to publicly express themselves on pending judicial proceedings. In the instant case, this has undoubtedly impacted on the proceedings of the criminal case. 29. That the Court further notes that on appeal the case was heard by the Civil Division of the Superior Court of Justice of Santa Cruz, Bolivia (hereinafter, the “Civil Division”.) In the appeal judgment rendered by this court (supra Having Seen clause No. 12) it was expressed that “[a]s the two criminal divisions and two regular members of the [Civil] Division excused themselves, Associate Judges were appointed […]” to hear the case and deliver judgment on appeal. The State did not refer to this matter in particular. 30. That in order to adequately assess compliance with the duty to investigate, identify and eventually punish those responsible for the forced disappearance of Trujillo-Oroza (operative paragraph three of the Judgment on reparations and costs, supra Having Seen clause No. 2,) the Court deems it necessary that the State furnish accurate information on the alleged consistency of the intervention of civil judges in criminal cases, both in the first and the second instances, with due process guarantees. b) Definition of the crime as charged in the criminal proceedings 31. That the representatives expressed discontent with the way in which the case was processed. In particular, they pointed out that the first instance judgment “failed to mention the forced disappearance crime [and that] the Judiciary never accounted for it as grounds for prosecution of the defendants.” Furthermore, they highlighted that as the crime of forced disappearance of persons was not defined in the criminal law at the time the proceedings were instituted, it has been presumed by analogy that the applicable