20 overcome said presumption. Furthermore, in light of the existence of favorable evidence, the principle of the presumption of innocence calls for judicial authorities to lay out the reasoning why said favorable evidence does not elicit a doubt about the criminal liability of the person in question. 69. In the instant case, from the reading of the judgment of conviction, the Commission notes that neither of these two minimum safeguards described above were fulfilled. Thus, as to the first element, the Fifth Chamber was explicit in noting that the only evidence against Mr. Zegarra Marín was the statements of his co-defendants. After establishing the statement of one of the co-defendants, the judicial authority did not indicate the specific reasons to consider this statement itself sufficient to rebut his presumption of innocence. Moreover, as to the second element, the Commission observes that, nevertheless the existence of favorable evidence that directly contradicted the statements of Mr. Cárdenas Hurtado, the judicial authority did not record the grounds why such evidence did not generate at least doubt about its criminal responsibility, merely indicating, with no analysis, that the accusations of the co-defendants were “feasible.” 70. The Commission considers that the conviction of a person based only on the "feasibility" of the facts stated in the declaration of a co-defendant can be itself contrary to the principle of presumption of innocence. More over, in this case is the reversal of the burden of proof in the sense that Mr. Zegarra has to prove his innocence, which was reflected in the language cited above in the assessment made by the Fifth Chamber in noting that “no compelling exculpatory evidence has emerged to make him totally innocent of the offenses that he is charged with.” 46 71. Based on the foregoing considerations, the Commission concludes that the State of Peru violated the principle of the presumption of innocence and the duty to provide a basis in law and fact for judgments, as established in Articles 8.1 and 8.2 of the Convention, in connection with the obligations set forth in Article 1.1 thereof, to the detriment of Mr. Zegarra Marín. b. The right to appeal judgment and to judicial protection (Articles 8.2.h and 25 of the Convention in connection with Article 1.1 thereof) 72. Article 8.2.h of the American Convention provides that: 2. (…) During the proceedings, every person is entitled, with full equality, to the following minimum guarantees: h. 73. 46 the right to appeal the judgment to a higher court. Article 25 of the American Convention provides that: The Commission notes, based on the proven facts, that the violation of the principle of the presumption of innocence was established by two members of the Supreme Court in the Report of November 2, 1998. These Court Members considered that the judgment of conviction of November 8, 1996 did not take into account all of the evidence in the proceedings, especially the evidence favorable to the situation of Mr. Zegarra Marín, and that it was based on the accusatory statements of his co-defendants, even though there was no other corroborating evidence to this claim, in violation of Article 139.5 of the Constitution and 285 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and, especially, of the principle of the presumption of innocence. Additionally, in this report, reference is made to the reversal of the burden of proof. As is examined infra in the section pertaining to the right to judicial protection, despite this finding, no steps were taken to remedy said violation.