CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE A.A. CANÇADO TRINDADE 1. In voting in favour of the adoption of the present Provisional Measures of Protection, whereby the Inter-American Court of Human Rights orders that protection be extended to all the members of the Community of Peace of San José of Apartadó in Colombia, and to the persons who render services to it, I feel obliged to leave on the records, in this Concurring Opinion, my personal thoughts on the extent of the decision which the Court has just taken. This is a truly singular case, of great transcendence from the juridical perspective; in effect, the Provisional Measures of Protection hereby ordered by the Court respond adequately, in my view, to the new challenges of the international protection of human righs in this beginning of the XXIst century. Beyond the decision taken by the Court, such Measures in protection of human collectivities require, by their wide implications, a careful exam on the part of the contemporary jusinternationalist doctrine, aiming at the development of the legal regime of the obligations erga omnes of protection of the human being. 2. To start with, may I point out that the right of individual petition bunder the American Convention on Human Rights can, to my mind, present a collective dimension in two circumstances: first, when the petition is lodged by a collectivity of persons, although it refers to one sole alleged victim; and second, when the individual petition refers to a collectivity, whose members have presumably been victimized. In both circumstances, the basis of the right of action under the American Convention is the violation of an individual right protected by this latter4, - what in no way affects the objetive character of the conventional obligations undertaken by the States Parties5. In this way, the exercise of the right of individual petition contributes decisively to the satisfaction of the common interest in the fulfilment of the object and purpose of the Convention6. 3. This legitimatio ad causam of the individuals under the American Convention distinguishes itself, in this way, from the rationale of the institute of the actio popularis (cf. infra). This does not mean that one could not develop some sort of actio popularis in the International Law of Human Rights in general, and under the American Convention in particular. In fact, this latter contains an embryo of actio popularis, not utilized to date under such Convention: I refer myself to the mechanism of the interState petitions (Article 45 of the Convention)7, which can be interposed in a "disinterested" way so as to secure the observance of the conventional obligations erga 4 . C.Th. Eustathiades, "Les recours individuels à la Commission Européenne des Droits de l'Homme", in Grundprobleme des internationalen Rechts - Festschrift für Jean Spiropoulos, Bonn, Schimmelbusch & Co., 1957, p. 121; and cf. M. Pilotti, "Le recours des particuliers devant les juridictions internationales", in Grundprobleme..., ibid., p. 351. 5 . E. Müller-Rappard, "Le droit d'action en vertu des dispositions de la Convention Européenne des Droits de l'Homme", 4 Revue belge de Droit international (1968) pp. 491-492. 6 . H. Rolin, "Le rôle du requérant dans la procédure prévue par la Commission Européenne des Droits de l'Homme", 9 Revue hellénique de Droit international (1956) pp. 3-14, esp. p. 9; F. Durante, Ricorsi Individuali ad Organi Internazionali, Milano, Giuffrè, 1958, pp. 125-152, esp. pp. 129-130. 7 . Cf., in this sense, as to, inter alia, the European and American Conventions on Human Rights: Egon Schwelb, "The Actio Popularis and International Law", 2 Israel Yearbook on Human Rights (1972) pp. 51-52 and 54-56.