In addressing the issue of a “reasonable time” under Articles 7(5) and 8(1) of the Convention, the Inter- American Court has confirmed that the purpose of the reasonable time requirement is to prevent accused persons from remaining in that situation for a protracted period and to ensure that a charge is disposed of promptly. 89 The InterAmerican Court has also considered that the point from which a reasonable time is to be calculated is the first act of the criminal proceedings, such as the arrest of the defendant, and that the proceeding is at an end when a final and firm judgment is delivered and the jurisdiction thereby ceases. According to the Inter-American Court, the calculation of a reasonable time must, particularly in criminal matters, encompass the entire proceeding, including any appeals that may be filed.90 73. The petitioners contend that the period between the date of arrest on February 21, 1995 and the commencement of trial on January 15, 1997 constitutes a violation of the right to be brought to trial within a reasonable time as required by Article 7.5 of the Convention.91 The State, for its part, denies the existence of any undue delay in the trial. 74. Messrs. Dial and Dottin were arrested on February 21, 1995, the trial started on January 15, 1997, and on January 21, 1997, they were sentenced to death. Therefore, there was a delay of almost 23 months from the date of the arrests to the date they were brought to trial. The Commission notes that there is no information before it on the proceedings carried out by the authorities during that period, nor does the State report on them. The Commission further notes that the prosecution does not appear to have been particularly complex, and there is also no indication that the prosecution’s case consisted of complex evidence that might assist in explaining such a delay. The State has failed to provide the Commission with any information suggesting that the case was sufficiently complex to warrant a 23-month delay between the victims’ arrest and the sentencing. Similarly, there is no information before the Commission concerning the procedural activity of the victims or the conduct of the judicial authorities that explains or justifies such delay. 75. In light of the Commission’s prior jurisprudence,92 and that of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights93 and other international authorities, the Commission is of the view that this delay is prima facie unreasonable and calls for justification by the State.94 The State, however, has failed to provide any proper justification for the delay in bringing the alleged victims to trial. 76. The Commission therefore concludes that the State failed to try the alleged victims without undue delay and within a reasonable time contrary to Articles 7.5 and 8.1 of the American Convention. Given that the Commission has found that the death sentences imposed upon the victims contravene Articles 4, 5, and 8 of the Convention and are therefore unlawful, the Commission does not consider it necessary to determine whether the length of the delays in trying the victims constituted cruel, unusual or degrading punishment or treatment. 3. Right to judicial protection and to commutation of a death sentence95 77. As stated by the Inter-American Court, Article 4.6 of the American Convention, when read together with Articles 8 and 1.1, places the State under the obligation to guarantee that an offender sentenced to death may effectively exercise the right to apply for amnesty, pardon, or commutation of sentence. Regarding the right to I/A Court H.R., Case of Suarez Rosero Case v. Ecuador. Merits. Judgment of November 12, 1997. Series C No. 35, para. 70. Id., para. 71. 91 Ibid. 92 IACHR. Report No 41/00, Case No 12.023, Desmond McKenzie, Case No 12.044, Andrew Downer and Alphonso Tracey, Case No 12.027, Carl Baker, Case12.126, Dwight Fletcher, and Case 12.146 (Anthony Rose). Jamaica. April 13, 2000, at 918. 93 I/A Court H.R., Case of Hilaire, Constantine and Benjamin et al. v. Trinidad and Tobago. Judgment of June 21, 2002. Series C No. 94, paras. 132-152, p71, para. 3. 94 See e.g. Suarez Romero Case, supra, p. 300, para. 73 (finding that a period of delay 4 years and 2 months between the victim’s arrest and disposition of his final appeal to “far exceed” the reasonable time contemplated in the Convention and therefore to violate Articles 7(5) and 8(1) of the Convention.); I/A Comm. H.R., Report on Panama, ANNUAL REPORT 1991, at p. 485 (finding an average pre-trial delay of 2 years and 4 months to be unreasonable contrary to Article 7(5) of the Convention); Desmond Williams v. Jamaica, supra, para. 9.4 (finding a delay of two years between arrest and trial to be prolonged and unreasonable); U.N.H.R.C., Patrick Taylor v. Jamaica, Communication No 707/1996, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/60/D/707/1996 (1997) (finding a delay of 28 months between arrest and trial to be a violation of the petitioner’s right to be tried without undue delay). 95 Article 4 (Right to Life) of the American Convention provides: (…) 6. Every person condemned to death shall have the right to apply for amnesty, pardon, or commutation of sentence, which may be granted in all cases. Capital punishment shall not be imposed while such a petition is pending decision by the competent authority. 89 90 16