11) That under these conditions, notaries can be defined as legal professionals engaged in a private activity, but with some attributes comparable to public administration, and the acts they perform, associated with private juridical commerce, attest to private relations and do not express the will of the State, as normally expressed through its bodies. (...) 13) That in addition, and even allowing that attestation of documents is the most substantive function performed by notaries, it cannot be ignored that they perform other functions as independent professionals that do not involve attestation. It therefore seems absurd for this duality to exist in those seeking to be defined as public officials (...).30 57. Without prejudice to this, and independent of the possible discussion of whether, in the Latin system, notaries are liberal professionals who perform public functions, more than public officials, for the purposes of justifying differentiated treatment, the State has not expressed the reasons why permitting foreigners to exercise public functions or have the status of public officials would affect the aim of sovereignty, as regards the notary profession. 58. Although the State has not submitted an explanation, the Commission can see how the State’s argument on the legitimate aim of securing sovereignty could highlight aspects such as the better understanding that, in principle, a national could have of legislation and the trust that citizens could place in such individuals to exercise their function in an area such as attestation, where trust is so important. However, it is the Commission’s view that, in addition to the fact that it would be complicated to justify this, even assuming that selecting citizens to serve as notaries could contribute to the aim of protecting a nation’s sovereignty or interests by offering profiles of individuals who are highly responsible and have adequate technical training, the State has less damaging means of satisfying this aim other than an absolute ban on foreign persons exercising the notary profession. 59. Effectively, the Commission has previously heard a case 31 in which legislation required citizenship to grant a law degree. At the time, the Commission noted that the reasons invoked for prohibiting foreigners from being lawyers included national interest, such as improving the exercise of the professional domestically; ensuring the professionals were fully knowledgeable of Chilean legislation; and preventing competition from foreigners. In the specific case, the Commission found that the knowledge necessarily came from the fact of having completed studies at a State-recognized university, ensuring that graduates—even if they were foreigners—would in principle be at least equal in suitability to any Chilean lawyer who had completed the same course of study. Thus, through this line of reasoning, the Commission concluded that the State has lessharmful measures available to it to attain its aims. Additionally, the Commission concluded that, although the petitioner was in competition with her Chilean colleagues, this was not a legitimate basis for discriminating against her because of her nationality. 60. In sum, the Commission found that it was technically possible to allow foreigners equal footing with citizens by revalidating their studies or giving a knowledge test. Along with this, the Commission found that a system of accountability or regular examinations of people exercising the notary profession would enable supervision of the observance and trustworthiness of correct procedure. 61. Third, the Commission underscored that a number of the national and international courts that have analyzed bans on noncitizens from exercising the notary profession in Latin notary systems have concluded that these limits that discriminate based on nationality or that restrict the right to work are not reasonable. 62. In Costa Rica, in 1993, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court found article 3 of the Organic Law of the Notary Profession unconstitutional. The law had established a requirement that individuals be Costa Rican by birth or by naturalization in order to exercise the notary profession. The Court found as follows: IV. This Chamber has acknowledged that the notary function is public, but there is no grounds for concluding that the exercise of public functions is reserved for Costa Ricans and excludes the participation of foreigners. The law may establish this, but the justification for doing so must be manifestly logical and reasonable: It cannot be based simply 30 31 Ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Vadell, Jorge Ferdnando v. Buenos Aires, December 18, 1984. IACHR, Report 56/10, Case 12,469, Margarita Cecilia Barbería Miranda (Chile), March 18, 2020. 11