54 216. Based on the foregoing conclusion, in the case of the majority of the victims, international responsibility of the State arose at the point in time when the victims had no opportunity to gain access to a remedy providing for a comprehensive review of their convictions before they became res judicata, because those particular provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure were in force prior to the legislative reforms. As was noted above, on this point the Commission will examine the subsequent amendments to the law, in order to assess whether the violation of the right to appeal the judgment adjudicated above, was or was not cured by the State, in amending the law. 2.2.1. Law No. 8503 of 2006 217. Based on the proven facts, Law No. 8503 amended several articles of the Code of Criminal Procedure pertaining to the writ of cassation. The Commission notes that Articles 443 and 445 of the Code of Criminal Procedure were not amended and, therefore, the admissibility requirements of the writ of cassation continued to be confined to grounds of non-observance or improper application of a provision of law. Likewise, it continued to be a requirement, in filing for the writ, to expressly set forth the legal provisions that were considered to not have been observed or to have been improperly applied. The Commission notes that the only change in the rules of cassation was made to Article 369 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This change provided for one new ground for admissibility, which read: “When the conviction has not been rendered under due process of law or with an opportunity for a defense.” 218. The Commission finds that the addition of these grounds did not remedy the crux of the issue with the writ for reversal of conviction on cassation, to wit, preclusion from review on appeal of issues of fact and evidence examined by the trial court. The Commission also notes that this provision did not amend in any way whatsoever the rigorous procedural formality in filing a petition for this writ. It became obvious that this was still an issue even after this new provision came into force in one of the proceedings of Rafael Rojas Madrigal, as well as in the proceeding of Jorge Martínez Meléndez. 219. Hence, as was established under the proven facts, in the case of Mr. Rafael Rojas Madrigal, the petition for writ of cassation for reversal of judgment No. 614-09 was denied as inadmissible by the Third Chamber, which rejected the arguments made by Mr. Rojas Madrigal, accepting the trial court’s finding of the facts as proven, with no regard for any possible examination thereof. Furthermore, Mr. Jorge Martínez Meléndez alleged in his case erroneous assessment of the evidence and the Third Chamber denied the petition noting that “it cannot be contested on cassation, as can be gathered by a simple reading of Article 443 of the Code (…), to object to the veracity of the facts set forth in the charging document.” The panel of the Third Chamber also rejected other allegations on the grounds that they were previously submitted and settled by the trial court. 220. Based on the foregoing, the Commission concludes that the State also violated Article 8.2.h of the American Convention, in connection with Articles 1.1 and 2 thereof, to the detriment of Rafael Rojas Madrigal and Jorge Martínez Meléndez. 221. Nonetheless, the Commission notes that this legislative reform established that individuals whose petition for writ of cassation were denied prior to it coming into force, should file a motion for review of conviction. In other words, the only option given to the victims named on paragraph 215 of the instant report, as instituted by this legislative reform was said motion for review, the scope of which was not substantially amended either. As was noted supra 203, the motion for review of conviction is an extraordinary remedy, and it has a different purpose than right to review by a