that the HRC has consistently rejected the notion that a petitioner under the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights must pursue a constitutional motion before the Supreme Constitutional Court in order to exhaust domestic remedies. The petitioners argue that the same reasoning ought to be valid for applications before the IACHR. 17. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the petitioners underscore that the constitutional motion, joined by the alleged victims, and which culminated in the commutation of the death sentence of Messrs. Dial and Dottin, in August 2008, contested strictly the constitutionality of executing the alleged victims, and therefore, did not encompass the arguments or subject matter of the petition. 18. The petitioners take note that Trinidad & Tobago denounced the American Convention on May 26, 1998 and that this denunciation took effect on May 26, 1999. Therefore, they contend that the IACHR is competent to consider the alleged violations of the American Convention for those facts which occurred up to the effective date of the denunciation. The petitioners rely on the American Declaration to ground the IACHR’s competence to consider the complaints related to facts that occurred after May 26, 1999. 19. With regard to the violations they attribute to the State, firstly, the petitioners contend that the alleged victims were entitled as from 2003 to have their death sentences commuted on the strength of applicable case law emanating from the JCPC, including the Cases of Roodal,9 Matthews10 and Pratt & Morgan.11 20. In this regard, the petitioners indicate that the Trinidad & Tobago Court of Appeals recognized that failure to give effect to the Pratt and Morgan decisions “may further aggravate the mental anguish on the part of the condemned man.” 12 The petitioners further allege that in August 2005, while the Inter-American Court’s Provisional Measures were in force, the State issued warrants of execution which were read to the alleged victims, following a public announcement by the Attorney General that the State intended to recommence executions of death row inmates. While the death sentences were eventually commuted to life imprisonment in August 2008, the petitioners maintain that the imposition of the death sentences, the years spent on death row, and the issuance of warrants of execution that were read to the alleged victims, gave rise to a violation of the rights to life and to personal integrity/humane treatment. 21. Secondly, the petitioners contend that during the whole course of criminal proceedings, beginning with the arrests of the alleged victims, the State failed to respect their right to personal liberty and due process guarantees. In this regard, the petitioners stress, inter alia: that the alleged victims were not told of the reasons for their detention at the time of their arrest, nor were they allowed to immediately contact a lawyer or a family member; they were not brought to trial within a reasonable time, since there was a delay of almost two years between their February 24, 1995 arrests and the beginning of their trial on January 15, 1997; they were not given prior notification in detail of the charges against them or the evidence on which the State was going to rely at trial; they were not provided with adequate legal representation by the State; they were not provided with adequate means for the preparation of their defense, nor could they afford adequate representation; and they were not permitted to communicate freely and privately with their counsel. The petitioners emphasize that the alleged victims’ deprivation of personal liberty resulted from illegal means, namely conspiracy and fabrication of evidence by the police, as demonstrated by the 1999 affidavits of the two eyewitnesses. 22. Thirdly, the petitioners argue that the conditions of pre-conviction and post-conviction detention of the alleged victims violated their right not to be exposed to cruel, inhuman, degrading, infamous, or unusual punishment or treatment. Indeed, the petitioners contend 9 Balkissoon Roodal v State of Trinidad & Tobago, [2003] PC 18. 10 Charles Matthews v State of Trinidad &Tobago [2004] PC 2. 11 Pratt & Morgan v R. (put: The Attorney General of Jamaica ) (on appeal from Jamaica), [1994] 2 AC 1. 12 The petitioners refer to The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago v. Angela Ramdeen [Cv.A No.6 of 2004], para. 39. 4