23 domestic courts have concluded that the imposition of corporal punishment, regardless of the circumstances of the case and the modalities through which it is carried out, constitutes cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, and represents a form of punishment no longer acceptable in a democratic society.24 67. The European Court of Human Rights has held that a treatment must attain a minimum level of severity in order to be considered inhuman or degrading and, in the extreme, torture. The evaluation of this minimum level is relative and depends on the circumstances of each case, such as the duration of the treatment, and its physical and mental effects.25 68. Furthermore, in the Celebici case the Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia analyzed international humanitarian law and human rights law standards, on the basis of which it defined inhuman or cruel treatment as: […] an intentional act or omission, that is an act which, judged objectively, is deliberate and not accidental, that causes serious mental or physical suffering or injury or constitutes a serious attack on human dignity.26 69. For its part, the Inter-American Court has, since the case of Loayza Tamayo v. Perú, held that: [t]he violation of the right to physical and psychological integrity of persons is a category of violation that has several gradations and embraces treatment ranging from torture to other types of humiliation or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment with varying degrees of physical and psychological effects caused by endogenous and exogenous factors which must be proven in each specific situation. The European Court of Human Rights has declared that, even in the absence of physical injuries, psychological and moral suffering, accompanied by psychic disturbance during questioning, may be deemed inhuman treatment. The degrading aspect is characterized 23 Examples of recent legislative change include: the Abolition of Corporal Punishment Ordinance 1998 (Anguilla), the of Corporal Punishment (Abolition) Act 2000 (British Virgin Islands), the Prisons (Amendment) Law 1998 (Cayman Islands), the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act (Act No 5 of 2003) (Kenya), the Punishment of Whipping Act 1996 (Pakistan) (but still permitted for “Hadood” crimes), and the Abolition of of Corporal Punishment Act 1997 (South Africa). 24 Cf. State v. Ncube 1987 (2) ZLR 246 (SC); 1988 (2) SA 702 (Zimbabwe Supreme Court); Court of First Instance of the Netherlands Antilles, cited by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Report to the Government of the Netherlands on the visit to the Netherlands Antilles from 7 to 11 December 1997, December 10, 1998, CPT/Inf (98)17 [Part 1], at 10; and Hope v. Pelzer, 122 S. Ct. 2508, No. 01-309, Supreme Court of the United States of America 122 S. Ct. 2508; Gates v. Collier 501 F. 2d 1292 at 1306 (5th Cir.); Ex parte Attorney General of Namibia, In re Corporal Punishment by Organs of the State, 1991 (3) SA 76 (Namibia Supreme Court), at 95F; State v. Williams and Others, 1995 (3) SA 632 (South Africa Constitutional Court), para. 11; Simon Kyamanywa v. Uganda, Constitutional Reference No. 10/2000, 1 December 2001 (Constitutional Court of Uganda); Naushad Ali v. State, Criminal Appeal No. HAA 0083/2001L, March 21, 2002 (Fiji High Court); y John Banda v. The People, HPA/6/1998 (High Court of Zambia). 25 Cf. Eur. Court H.R., Ireland v. United Kingdom, (1979-80), Judgment of January 18, 1978, paras. 162-163. 26 ICTFY, Prosecutor v. Delalic et al. (Celebici case), Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment of November 16, 1998, para. 552. See also Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac and Vukovic, Case No. IT-96-23-T and IT-9623/1-T, Judgment of February 22, 2001, para. 514; Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-45-14-T, Judgment of March 3, 2000, para. 186; and Prosecutor v. Jelesic, Case No. IT-95-10-T, Judgment of December 14, 1999, para. 41.