10 33. The Vienna Convention contains rules that must be interpreted as a whole. The usual meaning of the terms “in good faith,” “object and purpose of the treaty” and the other criteria combine to unravel the meaning of a specific provision. Furthermore, the Court stresses that international human rights law is composed of a series of rules (conventions, treaties and other international documents), and also of a series of values that these rules seek to develop. Therefore, the norms should also be interpreted based on a values-based model that the Inter-American System seeks to safeguard from the perspective of the “best approach” for the protection of the individual. In this regard, when dealing with a case such as this one, the Court must determine the interpretation that is best adapted to the series of rules and values that comprise international human rights law. Specifically, in this case, the Court must establish the values and objectives sought by the Convention of Belém do Pará and make an interpretation that develops them as fully as possible. This requires using all elements of the norm of interpretation in Article 31 cited above (supra para. 32). 34. Based on the foregoing, the Court will first examine its jurisdiction in relation to Article 7 of the Convention of Belém do Pará, and later resolve accordingly with regard to Articles 8 and 9 of this Convention. 1. Contentious jurisdiction of the Court concerning Article 7 of the Convention of Belém do Pará 1.1. The general rule of explicit jurisdiction and the criterion of literal interpretation 35. The State alleged that the Court can only interpret and apply the American Convention and other instruments that expressly grant it jurisdiction. In addition, it indicated that the Court, “exercising its advisory powers” may “examine and interpret treaties other than” the American Convention but, “when the Court is exercising its contentious jurisdiction, its powers do not extend to giving legal force to other treaties,” because “the fundamental principle governing the Court’s jurisdiction is the willingness [or express acceptance] of the State to submit to it.” It added that the principle of legal certainty “guarantees not only the stability of the Inter-American System” but also “the certainty of the State’s obligations deriving from its submission to the international organs for the protection of human rights.” 36. The Court considers that the State is correct in affirming that Article 62 of the American Convention established a rule of express jurisdiction, according to which the Court’s jurisdiction must be established by “special declaration” or by “special agreement.” 37. Mexico alleges that each Inter-American treaty requires a specific declaration granting jurisdiction to the Court. In this regard, the Tribunal stresses that, in Las Palmeras v. Colombia, it ratified the possibility of exercising its contentious jurisdiction with regard to Inter-American instruments other than the American Convention in the context of instruments that establish a system of petitions subject to international supervision in the regional sphere.28 In this regard, the special declaration accepting the contentious jurisdiction of the Court, based on Article 62 of the American Convention, allows the Court to examine violations to such Convention and also to other Inter-American instruments that grant it jurisdiction. 28 Cf. Case of Las Palmeras v. Colombia. Preliminary objections. Judgment of February 4, 2000. Series C No. 67, para. 34.