2 The Committee did not make distinctions between the different types of conduct when it stated in the above-mentioned Comment that: The aim of the provisions of Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is to protect both the dignity and the physical and mental integrity of the individual. It is the duty of the State party to afford everyone protection through legislative and other measures as may be necessary against the acts prohibited by Article 7, whether inflicted by people acting in their official capacity, outside their official capacity or in a private capacity.5 6. Nor did the European Court make any distinctions in the recent case of Opuz V. Turkey6, when it stated: As regards the question whether the State could be held responsible, under Article 3, for the ill-treatment inflicted on persons by non-state actors, the Court recalls that the obligation on the High Contracting Parties under Article 1 of the Convention to secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in the Convention, taken together with Article 3, requires States to take measures designed to ensure that individuals within their jurisdiction are not subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, including such ill-treatment administered by private individuals (see, mutatis mutandis, H.L.R. v. France, 29 April 1997, § 40, Reports 1997-III). Children and other vulnerable individuals, in particular, are entitled to State protection, in the form of effective deterrence, against such serious breaches of personal integrity (see A. v. the United Kingdom, 23 September 1998, § 22, Reports 1998-VI).7 7. As can be seen, none of these decisions or interpretations alludes to the requirement of the need for the active participation, acquiescence, tolerance or inaction of a State agent. This is a requirement added by the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture (hereinafter “the CIPST”) and by the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (hereinafter “the Convention against Torture”). Both Conventions are subsequent to the American Convention, since they entered into force in 1987. 8. On reading paragraphs 218, 219, 220 and 230 of this Judgment, it can be observed that the three victims suffered serious physical injuries and very probably some type of sexual abuse before they died. The State’s description of the bodies, even though initially inept, illustrates the scale of the treatment inflicted on them; therefore the facts should be considered acts of torture. 9. Accordingly, there appears to be no justification for not classifying the treatment applied to the three victims in this case as torture, apart from the fact that the Court considered that a State could not be found responsible for an act of torture if there was no evidence that it had been perpetrated by State agents or that it had been carried out when a public servant or employee, who could have prevented the act, failed to do so (Article 3(a)8 of the CIPST) or, in the terms of Article 19 of the 5 Cf. General Comment No. 20, supra note 3, para. 2. There is also a reference to acts of torture committed by private individuals in para. 13 of this General Comment, which reads: States parties should indicate when presenting their reports the provisions of their criminal law which penalize torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, specifying the penalties applicable to such acts, whether committed by public officials or other persons acting on behalf of the State, or by private persons. Those who violate Article 7, whether by encouraging, ordering, tolerating or perpetrating prohibited acts, must be held responsible. 6 Cf. European Court of Human Rights, Opuz v. Turkey, (Application no. 33401/02), Judgment Strasbourg, 9 June 2009, para. 159. See also, Z and others v. the United Kingdom (Application no. 29392/95), Judgment Strasbourg 10 May 2001, para. 73. 7 Cf. European Court of Human Rights, Opuz v. Turkey, supra note 6, para. 159. 8 Article 3 of the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture establishes: The following shall be held guilty of the crime of torture: (a) A public servant or employee who acting in that capacity orders, instigates or induces the use of torture, or who directly commits it or who, being able to prevent it, fails to do so.