the right recognized in the judicial ruling through the suitable application of that ruling.98 60. Accordingly, for there to be an effective remedy it does not suffice that it is provided for in a provision, or that it is formally admissible, but rather it must be genuinely suitable for establishing whether there has been a human rights violation and provide as necessary to remedy it.99 61. The Constitution in force at the time of the facts establishes at Article 18 that “no one may be … arrested other than by written order of a competent authority.” The IACHR recalls that said provision “does not set beforehand any cause or condition for detention.” 100 On referring to the “competent authority” the Constitution does not expressly regulate in whom such competence vests.101 Accordingly, the Commission must turn to other areas of the legal system, mindful of the specific circumstances in each case and the parties’ arguments. 62. As indicated in the section on facts proven, the Code of Criminal Procedure, in 1992, allowed for the detention “of those against whom there are vehement indicia or prima facie conclusive evidence guilt.” Law 23,950 of 1991 established that a person should be held “if there are duly founded circumstances that allow one to presume that someone has committed or may commit a criminal act.” In addition, the reform to the Code of Criminal Procedure indicates that the police agents should detain someone, even without judicial order, if “there are vehement indicia of guilt and there is an imminent danger of flight or serious impairment” of the proceedings. 63. The IACHR notes that the analysis for determining the legality and non-arbitrary nature of the detention is focused on the moment when the police agents decided to hold, question, and search Messrs. Fernández and Tumbeiro, situations which, as indicated, the European Court has considered to be included in the right not to be unlawfully and arbitrarily deprived of liberty. The analysis of the state action at that first moment in light of the safeguards in Articles 7 and 11 of the Convention is independent of the fact that after the search and even throughout the criminal proceeding it was found that the alleged victims in effect had committed a crime, which is outside of the scope of this analysis. 64. In the instant case it is not disputed that Messrs. Fernández and Tumbeiro were stopped and searched by police agents without a court order. Nor was it possible to perceive any situation of flagrancy at the moment the police agents decided to stop and search them. Accordingly, it is clear that the reasons that led to the stops and searches, whose findings led, in turn, to the arrest, were not based on these criteria, but on the police power to stop a person for suspicion in the terms regulated in the legislation. 65. The Commission considers that the states may and should regulate, in their provisions, the reasons, circumstances, and procedures that justify a deprivation of liberty and conducting a search. Nonetheless, in keeping with the standards described, Article 7(2) of the Convention requires not only the existence of such a regulation, but that it be as clear and detailed as possible and in keeping with the foreseeability that underlies the principle of juridical security. More specifically, the Commission considers it acceptable, in principle, for the states to grant police officers powers for crime prevention. Nonetheless, these powers should be accompanied by safeguards both in the legislation and in the institution, through adequate trainings, as well as by establishing serious mechanisms to ensure the accountability of police action. The existence of these safeguards is aimed at preventing arbitrary detentions in the terms of Article 7(3) of the Convention, even in the legitimate context of preventing crime. 66. The Commission observes that the regulation that granted the authority applied in the case is extremely vague and does not include specific references to objective reasons or parameters that could potentially 98 I/A Court HR. Case of Abrill Alosilla et al. v. Peru. Interpretation of the Judgment on the Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 21, 2011. Series C No. 235, para. 75. The cites within the original text were omitted. 99 I/A Court HR. Case of the Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay. Judgment of June 17, 2005. Series C No. 125, para. 61; I/A Court HR. Case of “Five Pensioners” v. Peru. Judgment of February 28, 2003. Series C No. 98, para. 136, and I/A Court HR. Case of the Awas Tingni Mayagna (Sumo) Community v. Nicaragua. Judgment of August 31, 2001. Series C No. 79, para. 113. 100 IACHR, Application before the I/A Court HR, Walter David Bulacio, Argentina, January 24, 2001, para. 79. 101 IACHR, Application before the I/A Court HR, Walter David Bulacio, Argentina, January 24, 2001, para. 79. 13