22 Preliminary Objections, Judgment of December 4, 1991, Series C No. 12, para. 18; Cayara Case, Preliminary Objections, supra 39, para. 42; and Caballero Delgado and Santana Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of January 21, 1994. Series C No. 17, para. 44). The Court has already declared that one distinctive feature of international law is that no special formalities are required to lend validity to an act. Even oral statements are valid under the law of nations (cf. Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, Judgment, 1933, P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 53, page 71; Garrido and Baigorria Case, Reparations, supra 84, para. 55 and Castillo Petruzzi et al. Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of September 4, 1998. Series C No. 41, para. 77). 98. Furthermore, the acts and instruments brought to bear in proceedings before the Court are not bound by the formalities required under the domestic laws of the respondent State. The consistent practice of this Court with regard to representation rules has been guided by these principles. Hence, the latitude the Court has allowed in matters of representation has been applied equally to States, to the InterAmerican Commission and, during the reparations phase, to the victims or their next of kin. 99. This latitude in accepting instruments granting representation is not without certain limits, however; limits dictated by the practical purpose that the representation itself is intended to serve. First, such instruments are to clearly identify the person granting the power of attorney and include an error-free statement of intent. They must also clearly name the party to whom the power of attorney is granted and, finally, specify the purpose of the representation. In the opinion of this Court, instruments that meet these requirements are valid and take full effect upon presentation to the Court. 100. In the case of the first power of attorney granted by the victim, the Court notes that the person being represented and her representatives were clearly identified, and the purpose of the representation was stated. That instrument, therefore, must be regarded as valid. In the case of the second instrument, the same requirements were met. Moreover, during the public hearing convened by the Court on June 9, 1998, the victim stated that her attorneys were Mr. Ariel E. Dulitzky and Ms. Carolina Loayza-Tamayo and endorsed everything they had done in their representations before the Court. Given these facts, the Court cannot ignore the will of the victim, on whose behalf the reparations proceeding is conceived; hence, it accepts as valid the procedures to which the State objects. * * * 101. As for the victim’s next of kin, the State argued that while the Court’s September 17, 1997 Judgment had ordered payment of compensation to the victim’s next of kin, those individuals had to appear before the Court to claim their rights. It further stated that in the instant Case, the children, parents and siblings of the victim had not intervened in any phase of the proceedings, had not filed any claim, and were therefore not entitled to any compensation. According to the State, by failing to appear, the victim’s next of kin had tacitly waived their right to compensation, especially inasmuch as the deadline set by the Court for making the respective claims has already expired. 102. In this regard, Article 23 of the Rules of Procedure provides that: