33 l) Estimated sums of US$18,000.00 (eighteen thousand United States dollars) and US$14,400 (fourteen thousand four hundred United States dollars) for the future costs of the rehabilitation of the victim and her next of kin, respectively. On this point, the State argued that the physical and mental condition of the victim and her next of kin prior to her detention had not been shown, so that this form of reparation would be absurd. It added that the current state of physical and mental health of those persons had also not been shown. Finally, it stated that this claim did not fit into the reparations ordered in the Judgment on the merits. 126. Peru also pointed out that the figures for the pecuniary damages claimed by the victim were given in dollars and not in Peru’s local currency. It argued that under its Budget Law, payment of remuneration in foreign currency is strictly prohibited. It also objected to the rate of exchange used to make the calculations, since the Peruvian “sol” had not remained fixed since 1993, the date on which the victim was detained, and was currently fluctuating between S/2.80 and S/2.82 to the dollar. Peru maintained, therefore, that the amount claimed, when expressed in dollars, would be less than the amount indicated in the victim’s brief. 127. As for the State’s objection to the currency in which the victim’s pecuniary claims were expressed, the Court notes that one effect of the reparations measures must be to preserve the real value of the amount received, so that it can achieve its compensatory intent. The Court previously held that “one of the easiest and most readily accessible ways to achieve this goal [is] the conversion of the amount received into one of the so-called hard currencies” (Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Interpretation of the Compensatory Damages Judgment (Art. 67 American Convention on Human Rights), Judgment of August 17, 1990. Series C No. 9, para. 42). In its case law, the reiterated practice of the Court has been to use the United States dollar as the "hard" currency in which the compensatory damages are figured and has found that this safeguard protects the purchasing power of the amounts ordered. Hence, the practice of quoting the amounts in that currency -amounts which may then be paid in the local currency of the respondent state at the exchange rate on the day prior to payment- is consistent with the Court’s customary practice, one that it confirms in the instant Case. However, in some instances the same expenditures are quoted in soles in the charts of estimated costs that the victim submitted as a reference aid, and then quoted in an equal number of United States dollars in the body of the victim’s reparations brief, as if parity existed between the two currencies (supra 50). In these cases, the Court used the amounts shown on receipts and in other credible documents to arrive at the figures shown in the section on proven facts. 128. In the case of pecuniary damages for survivors of human rights violations, the Court has held that the compensation to be awarded depends on a number of factors, one of which is the time during which the victim remained unemployed (El Amparo Case, Reparations (Art. 63(1) American Convention on Human Rights), Judgment of September 14, 1996. Series C No. 28, para. 28). That criterion applies here as well, inasmuch as the victim in the instant Case is alived.