5. The Court has been very specific and precise when establishing that certain components of the guarantees required to ensure due process are also applicable to the non-judicial sphere in a context in which issues that are relevant for the rights of the individual could be examined. Thus, the Court has understood in its previous case law that “the characteristics of impartiality and independence […] must govern every body responsible for determining the rights and obligations of the individual. In this regard, […] this should correspond not only to the organs that are strictly jurisdictional, but rather the provisions of Article 8(1) of the Convention also apply to the decisions of administrative bodies.”2 6. Article 8 is called “right to a fair trial [Note: in Spanish “garantías judiciales”] and then refers to a “judge or court.” However, the interpretation of this provision of the Convention cannot be restricted to the judicial sphere. To leave the understanding and interpretation of the article at this point would be exercising excessive self-restraint, and an unreasonable restrictive literal interpretation would immobilize its interpretation. Even without the said consistent case law, the fact is that the purpose of providing guarantees in the determination of rights and obligations flows from the very wording of Article 8(1) of the American Convention. 7. Indeed, from Article 8(1) it can be inferred that the evident significance of the treaty is its guarantee-based approach, because the judicial guarantees must be ensured “for the determination of [the] rights and obligations of a civil, labor, fiscal or any other nature” (underlining added). Consequently, the fact is that, despite the title of the said article, the guarantees extend to proceedings of other types. This has been and is the Court’s consistent interpretation, which has elected invariably to favor the guarantees in the diverse situations that have been submitted to it in the cases subject to its consideration. 8. This does not mean that the Inter-American Court is using a discretionary criterion. To the contrary, in order to decide disputes concerning the interpretation of its provisions, the Court has made use,3 as appropriate, of the rules of interpretation established in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, as well as the rules of interpretation established in the American Convention itself. The pertinent part of the Vienna Convention stipulates: Article 31. General rule of interpretation 1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. […] 4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended. 9. In this regard, the Court has taken into consideration, consistently, that the “ordinary meaning” of the treaty is related to its object and purpose so that the interpretation 2 Case of Vélez Loor v. Panama. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 23, 2010 Series C No. 218, para. 108. 3 Cf. Case of Ivcher Bronstein v. Peru. Competence. Judgment of September 24, 1999. Series C No. 54, para. 38; Case of Blake v. Guatemala. Interpretation of the judgment on reparations and costs. Judgment of October 1, 1999. Series C No. 57, para. 21, and Case of González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 16, 2009. Series C No. 205, para. 32. 2