32 A. Preliminary questions 152. The Commission notes that since Admissibility Report No. 68/05, the State has reiterated its allegation that the remedies under domestic law were not exhausted. The Commission considers that this case is framed by the State’s obligations with respect to its citizens and the principles that immigration policies must observe. Therefore, the Commission will examine the State’s allegations and will address the States’ obligations with respect to nationality and immigration. 1. Exhaustion of the remedies under domestic law 153. It is worth recalling that the issues in this case that are related to the exhaustion of the remedies under domestic law have already been examined when Admissibility Report No. 68/05 was adopted. The Commission would again point out that the petitioners claimed the exceptions provided for in articles 46(2)(a) and 46(2)(b) of the American Convention and the State did not duly contest the exception to the rule requiring exhaustion of local remedies. 2. The State’s obligations vis-à-vis its nationals and the principles that must be observed in immigration policy 154. The right to nationality recognized by international law must be regarded as the natural condition and inherent right of all human beings; it is the very basis for the exercise of political rights and 138 has an important bearing on the individual's civil capacity. Nationality is the legal link between an 139 individual and a given State. According to the practice of States, to arbitral and judicial decisions and to the opinions of writers, nationality is a legal bond having a s its basis a social fact of attachment, a genuine connection of existence, interests and sentiments, together with the 140 existence of reciprocal rights and duties. 155. The decision of a State to confer nationality must not be an arbitrary act. Inter-American Court has written that: 141 Here, the [a]lthough it has traditionally been accepted that the determination and regulation of nationality are the competence of each State, […] the evolution in this matter shows that international law imposes certain limits on a State’s discretionality and that, in the regulation of nationality, it is not only the competence of States, but also the requirements of the integral protection of human rights that 142 intervene. 138 I/A Court H.R., Proposed Amendment to the Naturalization Provision of the Constitution of Costa Rica. Advisory Opinion OC-4/84 of January 19, 1984. Series A No. 4, paragraph 32. 139 See, inter alia, Brownlie Ian, Principles of Public International Law, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1979. pp. 554-559; Nguyen Quoc Dinh, Patrick Daillier, Alain Pellet, Droit International Public, L.G.D.J., Paris, 1980, pp. 413-415; Max Sorensen, Manual de Derecho Internacional Público, Fondo de Cultura Económica, Mexico, 1973, pp. 453-456. See also I/A Court H.R., Case of Ivcher Bronstein v. Peru. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of February 6, 2001. Series C No. 74, paragraph 86; I/A Court H.R., Proposed Amendment to the Naturalization Provision of the Constitution of Costa Rica. Advisory Opinion OC=4/84 of January 19, 1984. Series A No. 4, paragraph 32. 140 IACHR, Application filed with the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of Dilcia Yean and Violeta Bosico Cofi v. Dominican Republic, July 11, 2003, paragraph 46, citing the ICJ, Case of Nottebohm (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala). Judgment of November 18, 1953. Recueil des Cours 1955, p. 23. 141 142 Nguyen Quoc Dinh, Patrick Daillier, Alain Pellet, Droit International Public, L.G.D.J., Paris, 1980, p. 414. I/A Court H.R., Case of Ivcher Bronstein v. Peru. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of February 6, 2001. Series C No. 74, paragraph 88; Case of Castillo Petruzzi et al. v. Peru. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of May 30, 1999. Series C No. 52, paragraph 101.