22 terrorist nature, stipulated a new criminal procedure for terrorism cases and regulated penitentiary matters. Subsequently, modifications were introduced, the most important ones were: in 1993 and 1994, the possibility of unconditional release during the first stage of the judicial proceeding was introduced (previously it had been virtually prohibited); the admissibility of actions for protection, such as habeas corpus, which had also been prohibited previously in terrorism cases, was established; the presentation to the public of those detained for terrorism, which had been a practice of the National Counterterrorism Directorate (hereinafter “DINCOTE”), was prohibited; a progressive modification of the penitentiary regime was introduced for those imprisoned for terrorism and treason. Also, at the end of 1997, the “faceless” tribunals were eliminated and an ordinary system for trying such crimes was established with the creation of the Corporative Superior Chamber for Terrorism Cases, subsequently the National Terrorism Chamber. The most important characteristics were the “ambiguous and vague” definition of the crime of terrorism; the new regime of penalties; the increase in the powers of the police without any oversight by the courts or prosecutors; the modifications to the procedures, such as a reduction in the powers of the Attorney General’s office (Ministerio Público); the obligation of the judge of the criminal court to file a complaint and open a preliminary investigation in all terrorism cases; the imposing of summary proceedings; and a judicial system with “faceless” judges. DINCOTE was a specialized unit of the Peruvian National Police (hereinafter “the PNP”) mandated to investigate acts of a terrorist nature and individuals linked to such acts. The police not only investigated; they directed the investigation, subordinated the prosecutor de facto, and extended the duration of the investigations; they also issued conclusions on the investigation and determined the criminal category of the act that had allegedly been committed. These powers were not supervised or controlled adequately by the Attorney General’s office or by the Judiciary, particularly at the time of the “faceless” judges. The Attorney General’s office became an institution in charge of formalizing the investigation procedures, an inversion of its constitutional mandate. The physicians prosecuted under the anti-terrorist legislation have been convicted for what is considered a medical activity. There is a problem with the definition when medical activities are considered an alleged act of collaboration. On January 3, 2003, the Constitutional Court delivered a judgment establishing, with regard to the basic category of terrorism contained in Article 2 of Decree Law No. 25,475, that a new interpretation should be given to the crime of terrorism, incorporating the intentionality of the perpetrator when committing the crime of terrorism; but it did not declare this article unconstitutional. The judgment of the Constitutional Court gave rise to a series of legislative decrees formulated over the following months. These included, Legislative Decree No. 926, which regulated the annulment of terrorism proceedings in