44 performed by the alleged victim, by considering that her behavior constituted acts of collaboration with terrorism. The breadth with which the criminal category of terrorism was defined opened the door to the possibility of making “such an arbitrary interpretation”; d) Both the Court and the Commission have concluded that the trials resulting from Peru’s anti-terrorist legislation led to the violation of different rights embodied in the American Convention; e) The definition of the crime of terrorism established in article 2 of Decree Law No. 25,475 is incompatible with the principle of legality embodied in the American Convention, because the acts that constitute the crime were formulated abstractly and ambiguously, which means that it is impossible to know the specific behavior that constitutes the respective category of crime; f) The principle of legality has a specific role in the definition of crimes; on the one hand, it guarantees individual liberty and safety by preestablishing the behavior that is penalized clearly and unambiguously and, on the other hand, it protects legal certainty; g) The judgment of the Constitutional Court of January 3, 2003, declared that the definition of the crime of terrorism contained in Decree Law No. 25,475 was compatible with the Constitution, and abstained from assessing the criminal category of acts of collaboration with terrorism; h) The new interpretation made by the Constitutional Court does not resolve the serious defects and imperfections that have afflicted the definition of the crime of terrorism since it was established; i) When she was detained, the alleged victim was not informed of the reason for her detention, and she was not shown any detention order; rather, she was notified of the arrest warrant against her when she was taken before the panel of judges; j) Although the alleged victim’s detention was the result of a judicial order, this order was issued under the anti-terrorist legislation (Decree Laws Nos. 25,475, 25,659, 25,499 and 26,508) previously examined by the Court and declared incompatible with the American Convention; k) Even though the remedy of habeas corpus had already been reestablished when the alleged victim was detained, in the practice this fundamental remedy was severely restricted so that it was ineffective; l) Legislative Decree No. 926 of February 19, 2003, established that, within 60 days of its coming into force, orders must be issued for the criminal trials and the judgment to be annulled in trials for the crime of terrorism held in civil courts with unidentified judges or prosecutors. “Under the rationale of respect for the rights protected by the Convention, especially personal liberty and the presumption of innocence,” the alleged victim should have obtained her immediate release since a final judgment had not been delivered in her case. However, Legislative Decree No. 926 did not provide for this possibility;