45 m) The new legislation “did not include the time Mrs. De La Cruz Flores had been deprived of liberty owing to the anticipated proceeding under file 113-95, from March 27, 1996, to the day [the application was submitted], 7 years, 2 months and 15 days, [which] constitutes arbitrary detention.” Even if this is considered preventive detention, it is excessive and unreasonable; n) Although it is true that the State has given Mrs. De La Cruz Flores back her liberty by the decision of July 8, 2004, and the violation has ceased, it is also true that it occurred and caused very grave consequences that must be repaired; o) The judges who tried María Teresa De La Cruz Flores formed part of a “faceless” court, established in accordance with Article 15(1) of Decree Law No. 25,475 and, when the identity of the judge is not known, it affects the possibility of knowing whether he is independent and impartial; p) Even though the second-instance judgment (which confirmed the judgment convicting the alleged victim) was delivered by “identified judges,” this fact does not, in itself, eradicate the violation of the right to an impartial judge and to due process; q) Legislative Decree No. 926 ordered the annulment of the trials held and the judgments issued by unidentified judges and prosecutors in case of crimes of terrorism, and also that new trials should be held. When the application was submitted, the new trial regime to which the alleged victim would have had a right, within the non-extendible period of two months indicated in the law, had not been applied to her case; r) The principle of presumption of innocence has been threatened from the onset of the proceedings, given the broad investigative authority granted to DINCOTE to prepare its report or deposition. This report became a fundamental element in the prosecutor’s opinion and the input for the charge, that determined the possibility of the defendant’s release and, ultimately, her sentence; s) Months before her detention, two DINCOTE depositions, of September and October 1995, already defined the alleged victim’s behavior as acts of collaboration with terrorism, and the police had assigned jurisdiction for prosecuting the case to a “faceless” civilian court. The prosecutor “merely transcribed the evidence and the conclusions of the police [officers] to request the opening of the pre-trial investigation”; t) The alleged victim was unable to learn what she had been charged with beforehand, or take part in the pre-trial investigation or offer evidence or explanations; u) The judicial official appointed to hear the case was committed to opening the pre-trial investigation and ordering preventive detention as a safety measure, without being able to consider that the probative evidence was insufficient, and thus abstaining from opening the pre-trial investigation; v) The Constitutional Court’s decision of January 3, 2003, did not remedy this situation in the instant case, owing to its “automatic association” with the criminal proceeding and the related preventive detention;