19 73. The main cause for concern was that on account of the institutional crisis the country was facing, there was no body with competence for “addressing the unconstitutionality of some of the legal and regulatory provisions of the process whereby justices were assessed.” That was because all the members of the Constitutional Court had been dismissed and it was legally impossible to set up a new Constitutional Court until the Supreme Court of Justice was installed and could submit a shortlist. 60 In light of those concerns, the chairman of the Qualifying Committee had ruled that both the regulations and the law would be applied in accordance with the Constitution and with the international treaties ratified by Ecuador. 61 74. As a result, Ecuador remained without a Supreme Court of Justice for approximately seven months. 62 IV. ANALYSIS OF LAW A. Preliminary matters 75. Before embarking on its analysis of the parties’ claims under the provisions of the American Convention, the Commission reiterates that in Admissibility Report 8/07 of February 27, 2007, dealing with this case, it concluded that the facts set out did not tend to establish a possible violation of the rights enshrined in Articles 23 and 24 of the American Convention. Although at the merits stage both parties continued to submit claims regarding those rights, the Commission finds no reason to deviate from its admissibility ruling and, consequently, the analysis of the merits will address the rights enshrined in Articles 8, 9, and 25 of the American Convention, in light of the obligations set out in Articles 1.1 and 2 thereof. 76. The Commission notes that the crux of the dispute in this case is whether the termination of the entire Supreme Court of Justice under the National Congress’s resolution of December 8, 2004, was in accordance with the terms of the American Convention. Given the judicial nature of Supreme Court positions, the Commission believes it must first offer a series of preliminary considerations on the principle of judicial independence, since that principle informs the entire subsequent analysis on the scope of the guarantees to which the alleged victims were entitled. In addition, and because the congressional resolution terminated the Supreme Court of Justice appointed in 1997 on the grounds that all the justices had exceeded their term in office, the Commission will analyze the regulatory framework to which the Supreme Court of Justice was subject at the time of the facts. The Commission will then determine whether the international responsibility of the State of Ecuador was triggered with respect to the rights established in Articles 8, 9, and 25 of the American Convention. B. The principle of judicial independence and its effects on the analysis of the case 77. This principle is set out in Article 8.1 of the American Convention and represents one of the basic pillars of a democratic system. On this point, the Inter-American Court has stated that one of the principal purposes of the separation of public powers is to guarantee the 60 Annex 19. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, Leandro Despouy, E/CN.4/2005/60/Add.4, Preliminary Report on the Mission to Ecuador, March 29, 2005. (Annex to the petitioners’ submission, presented at the hearing held before the IACHR on March 13, 2006.) 61 Annex 19. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, Leandro Despouy, E/CN.4/2005/60/Add.4, Preliminary Report on the Mission to Ecuador, March 29, 2005. (Annex to the petitioners’ submission, presented at the hearing held before the IACHR on March 13, 2006.) 62 Annex 4. Statement of Hugo Quintana Coello, given on May 14, 2007, to the 23rd Notary of the canton of Quito. (Annex to petitioners’ submission, received on May 24, 2007.)